Federalist Papers
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NO. 13    Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government.
NO. 84    Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
NO. 6    Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
NO. 2    Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 37    Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
NO. 30    Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 59    Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 85    Concluding Remarks
NO. 1    General Inroduction
NO. 41    General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution
NO. 49    Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
NO. 58    Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
NO. 66    Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
NO. 14    Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered.
NO. 21    Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 50    Periodic Appeals to the People Considered
NO. 44    Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
NO. 45    The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
NO. 57    The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
NO. 77    The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
NO. 76    The Appointing Power of the Executive
NO. 54    The Apportionment of Members Among the States
NO. 74    The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
NO. 39    The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
NO. 8    The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
NO. 71    The Duration in Office of the Executive.
NO. 67    The Executive Department
NO. 70    The Executive Department Further Considered
NO. 52    The House of Representatives
NO. 26    The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 46    The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
NO. 15    The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 82    The Judiciary Continued
NO. 83    The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
NO. 81    The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
NO. 78    The Judiciary Department
NO. 79    The Judiciary Department Continued
NO. 68    The Mode of Electing the President
NO. 23    The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
NO. 47    The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
NO. 29    THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy
NO. 42    The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 24    The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 40    The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
NO. 80    The Powers of the Judiciary
NO. 64    The Powers of the Senate
NO. 65    The Powers of the Senate Continued
NO. 73    The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
NO. 69    The Real Character of the Executive
Close
End of Federalist Paper No. 69
FEDERALIST NO. 69
The Real Character of the Executive
From the New York Packet     Friday March 14, 1788
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of New York


DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=69- ParaX=1- XthisXParaX=1-
DeB 131 -1-I PROCEED now to trace the real characters of the proposed Executive, as they are marked out in the plan of the convention. DeB 131 -2-This will serve to place in a strong light the unfairness of the representations which have been made in regard to it.

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DeB 131 -1-The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate. DeB 131 -2-This will scarcely, however, be considered as a point upon which any comparison can be grounded; for if, in this particular, there be a resemblance to the king of Great Britain, there is not less a resemblance to the Grand Seignior, to the khan of Tartary, to the Man of the Seven Mountains, or to the governor of New York.

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DeB 131 -1-That magistrate is to be elected for FOUR years; and is to be re-eligible as often as the people of the United States shall think him worthy of their confidence. DeB 131 -2-In these circumstances there is a total dissimilitude between HIM and a king of Great Britain, who is an HEREDITARY monarch, possessing the crown as a patrimony descendible to his heirs forever; but there is a close analogy between HIM and a governor of New York, who is elected for THREE years, and is re-eligible without limitation or intermission. DeB 131 -3-If we consider how much less time would be requisite for establishing a dangerous influence in a single State, than for establishing a like influence throughout the United States, we must conclude that a duration of FOUR years for the Chief Magistrate of the Union is a degree of permanency far less to be dreaded in that office, than a duration of THREE years for a corresponding office in a single State.

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DeB 131 -1-The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. DeB 131 -2-The person of the king of Great Britain is sacred and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable; no punishment to which he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a national revolution. DeB 131 -3-In this delicate and important circumstance of personal responsibility, the President of Confederated America would stand upon no better ground than a governor of New York, and upon worse ground than the governors of Maryland and Delaware.

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DeB 131 -1-The President of the United States is to have power to return a bill, which shall have passed the two branches of the legislature, for reconsideration; and the bill so returned is to become a law, if, upon that reconsideration, it be approved by two thirds of both houses. DeB 131 -2-The king of Great Britain, on his part, has an absolute negative upon the acts of the two houses of Parliament. DeB 131 -3-The disuse of that power for a considerable time past does not affect the reality of its existence; and is to be ascribed wholly to the crown's having found the means of substituting influence to authority, or the art of gaining a majority in one or the other of the two houses, to the necessity of exerting a prerogative which could seldom be exerted without hazarding some degree of national agitation. DeB 131 -4-The qualified negative of the President differs widely from this absolute negative of the British sovereign; and tallies exactly with the revisionary authority of the council of revision of this State, of which the governor is a constituent part. DeB 131 -5-In this respect the power of the President would exceed that of the governor of New York, because the former would possess, singly, what the latter shares with the chancellor and judges; but it would be precisely the same with that of the governor of Massachusetts, whose constitution, as to this article, seems to have been the original from which the convention have copied.

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DeB 131 -1-The President is to be the "commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States. DeB 131 -2-He is to have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, EXCEPT IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT; to recommend to the consideration of Congress such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; to convene, on extraordinary occasions, both houses of the legislature, or either of them, and, in case of disagreement between them WITH RESPECT TO THE TIME OF ADJOURNMENT, to adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper; to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; and to commission all officers of the United States." DeB 131 -3-In most of these particulars, the power of the President will resemble equally that of the king of Great Britain and of the governor of New York. DeB 131 -4-The most material points of difference are these: DeB 131 -6-The President will have only the occasional command of such part of the militia of the nation as by legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the Union. DeB 131 -7-The king of Great Britain and the governor of New York have at all times the entire command of all the militia within their several jurisdictions. DeB 131 -8-In this article, therefore, the power of the President would be inferior to that of either the monarch or the governor. DeB 131 -9-Secondly. The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. DeB 131 -10-In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. DeB 131 -11-It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the DECLARING of war and to the RAISING and REGULATING of fleets and armies, all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.[1] DeB 131 -12-The governor of New York, on the other hand, is by the constitution of the State vested only with the command of its militia and navy. DeB 131 -13-But the constitutions of several of the States expressly declare their governors to be commanders-in-chief, as well of the army as navy; and it may well be a question, whether those of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, in particular, do not, in this instance, confer larger powers upon their respective governors, than could be claimed by a President of the United States. DeB 131 -14-Thirdly. The power of the President, in respect to pardons, would extend to all cases, EXCEPT THOSE OF IMPEACHMENT. DeB 131 -15-The governor of New York may pardon in all cases, even in those of impeachment, except for treason and murder. DeB 131 -16-Is not the power of the governor, in this article, on a calculation of political consequences, greater than that of the President? DeB 131 -17-All conspiracies and plots against the government, which have not been matured into actual treason, may be screened from punishment of every kind, by the interposition of the prerogative of pardoning. DeB 131 -18-If a governor of New York, therefore, should be at the head of any such conspiracy, until the design had been ripened into actual hostility he could insure his accomplices and adherents an entire impunity. DeB 131 -19-A President of the Union, on the other hand, though he may even pardon treason, when prosecuted in the ordinary course of law, could shelter no offender, in any degree, from the effects of impeachment and conviction. DeB 131 -20-Would not the prospect of a total indemnity for all the preliminary steps be a greater temptation to undertake and persevere in an enterprise against the public liberty, than the mere prospect of an exemption from death and confiscation, if the final execution of the design, upon an actual appeal to arms, should miscarry? DeB 131 -21-Would this last expectation have any influence at all, when the probability was computed, that the person who was to afford that exemption might himself be involved in the consequences of the measure, and might be incapacitated by his agency in it from affording the desired impunity? DeB 131 -22-The better to judge of this matter, it will be necessary to recollect, that, by the proposed Constitution, the offense of treason is limited "to levying war upon the United States, and adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort"; and that by the laws of New York it is confined within similar bounds. DeB 131 -23-Fourthly. The President can only adjourn the national legislature in the single case of disagreement about the time of adjournment. DeB 131 -24-The British monarch may prorogue or even dissolve the Parliament. DeB 131 -25-The governor of New York may also prorogue the legislature of this State for a limited time; a power which, in certain situations, may be employed to very important purposes.

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DeB 131 -1-The President is to have power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur. DeB 131 -2-The king of Great Britain is the sole and absolute representative of the nation in all foreign transactions. DeB 131 -3-He can of his own accord make treaties of peace, commerce, alliance, and of every other description. DeB 131 -4-It has been insinuated, that his authority in this respect is not conclusive, and that his conventions with foreign powers are subject to the revision, and stand in need of the ratification, of Parliament. DeB 131 -5-But I believe this doctrine was never heard of, until it was broached upon the present occasion. DeB 131 -6-Every jurist [2] of that kingdom, and every other man acquainted with its Constitution, knows, as an established fact, that the prerogative of making treaties exists in the crown in its utmost plentitude; and that the compacts entered into by the royal authority have the most complete legal validity and perfection, independent of any other sanction. DeB 131 -7-The Parliament, it is true, is sometimes seen employing itself in altering the existing laws to conform them to the stipulations in a new treaty; and this may have possibly given birth to the imagination, that its co-operation was necessary to the obligatory efficacy of the treaty. DeB 131 -8-But this parliamentary interposition proceeds from a different cause: from the necessity of adjusting a most artificial and intricate system of revenue and commercial laws, to the changes made in them by the operation of the treaty; and of adapting new provisions and precautions to the new state of things, to keep the machine from running into disorder. DeB 131 -9-In this respect, therefore, there is no comparison between the intended power of the President and the actual power of the British sovereign. DeB 131 -10-The one can perform alone what the other can do only with the concurrence of a branch of the legislature. DeB 131 -11-It must be admitted, that, in this instance, the power of the federal Executive would exceed that of any State Executive. DeB 131 -12-But this arises naturally from the sovereign power which relates to treaties. DeB 131 -13-If the Confederacy were to be dissolved, it would become a question, whether the Executives of the several States were not solely invested with that delicate and important prerogative.

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DeB 131 -1-The President is also to be authorized to receive ambassadors and other public ministers. DeB 131 -2-This, though it has been a rich theme of declamation, is more a matter of dignity than of authority. DeB 131 -3-It is a circumstance which will be without consequence in the administration of the government; and it was far more convenient that it should be arranged in this manner, than that there should be a necessity of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign minister, though it were merely to take the place of a departed predecessor.

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DeB 131 -1-The President is to nominate, and, WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers, judges of the Supreme Court, and in general all officers of the United States established by law, and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the Constitution. DeB 131 -2-The king of Great Britain is emphatically and truly styled the fountain of honor. DeB 131 -3-He not only appoints to all offices, but can create offices. DeB 131 -4-He can confer titles of nobility at pleasure; and has the disposal of an immense number of church preferments. DeB 131 -5-There is evidently a great inferiority in the power of the President, in this particular, to that of the British king; nor is it equal to that of the governor of New York, if we are to interpret the meaning of the constitution of the State by the practice which has obtained under it. DeB 131 -6-The power of appointment is with us lodged in a council, composed of the governor and four members of the Senate, chosen by the Assembly. DeB 131 -7-The governor CLAIMS, and has frequently EXERCISED, the right of nomination, and is ENTITLED to a casting vote in the appointment. DeB 131 -8-If he really has the right of nominating, his authority is in this respect equal to that of the President, and exceeds it in the article of the casting vote. DeB 131 -9-In the national government, if the Senate should be divided, no appointment could be made; in the government of New York, if the council should be divided, the governor can turn the scale, and confirm his own nomination.[3] DeB 131 -10-If we compare the publicity which must necessarily attend the mode of appointment by the President and an entire branch of the national legislature, with the privacy in the mode of appointment by the governor of New York, closeted in a secret apartment with at most four, and frequently with only two persons; and if we at the same time consider how much more easy it must be to influence the small number of which a council of appointment consists, than the considerable number of which the national Senate would consist, we cannot hesitate to pronounce that the power of the chief magistrate of this State, in the disposition of offices, must, in practice, be greatly superior to that of the Chief Magistrate of the Union.

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DeB 131 -1-Hence it appears that, except as to the concurrent authority of the President in the article of treaties, it would be difficult to determine whether that magistrate would, in the aggregate, possess more or less power than the Governor of New York. DeB 131 -2-And it appears yet more unequivocally, that there is no pretense for the parallel which has been attempted between him and the king of Great Britain. DeB 131 -3-But to render the contrast in this respect still more striking, it may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer group.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=69- ParaX=11- XthisXParaX=11-
DeB 131 -1-The President of the United States would be an officer elected by the people for FOUR years; the king of Great Britain is a perpetual and HEREDITARY prince. DeB 131 -2-The one would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace; the person of the other is sacred and inviolable. DeB 131 -3-The one would have a QUALIFIED negative upon the acts of the legislative body; the other has an ABSOLUTE negative. DeB 131 -4-The one would have a right to command the military and naval forces of the nation; the other, in addition to this right, possesses that of DECLARING war, and of RAISING and REGULATING fleets and armies by his own authority. DeB 131 -5-The one would have a concurrent power with a branch of the legislature in the formation of treaties; the other is the SOLE POSSESSOR of the power of making treaties. DeB 131 -6-The one would have a like concurrent authority in appointing to offices; the other is the sole author of all appointments. DeB 131 -7-The one can confer no privileges whatever; the other can make denizens of aliens, noblemen of commoners; can erect corporations with all the rights incident to corporate bodies. DeB 131 -8-The one can prescribe no rules concerning the commerce or currency of the nation; the other is in several respects the arbiter of commerce, and in this capacity can establish markets and fairs, can regulate weights and measures, can lay embargoes for a limited time, can coin money, can authorize or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin. DeB 131 -9-The one has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction; the other is the supreme head and governor of the national church! What answer shall we give to those who would persuade us that things so unlike resemble each other? DeB 131 -10-The same that ought to be given to those who tell us that a government, the whole power of which would be in the hands of the elective and periodical servants of the people, is an aristocracy, a monarchy, and a despotism.

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DeB 131 -1-1. A writer in a Pennsylvania paper, under the signature of TAMONY, has asserted that the king of Great Britain owes his prerogative as commander-in-chief to an annual mutiny bill. DeB 131 -2-The truth is, on the contrary, that his prerogative, in this respect, is immemorial, and was only disputed, "contrary to all reason and precedent," as Blackstone vol.i. , page 262, expresses it, by the Long Parliament of Charles I. but by the statute the 13th of Charles II., chap. 6, it was declared to be in the king alone, for that the sole supreme government and command of the militia within his Majesty's realms and dominions, and of all forces by sea and land, and of all forts and places of strength, EVER WAS AND IS the undoubted right of his Majesty and his royal predecessors, kings and queens of England, and that both or either house of Parliament cannot nor ought to pretend to the same.

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DeB 131 -1-2. Vide Blackstone's "Commentaries," vol i., p. 257.

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DeB 131 -1-3. Candor, however, demands an acknowledgment that I do not think the claim of the governor to a right of nomination well founded. DeB 131 -2-Yet it is always justifiable to reason from the practice of a government, till its propriety has been constitutionally questioned. DeB 131 -3-And independent of this claim, when we take into view the other considerations, and pursue them through all their consequences, we shall be inclined to draw much the same conclusion.

Beginning of Federalist Paper No. 69

Close

NO. 61    The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
NO. 34    The Same Subject Continued Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 72    The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
NO. 38    The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
NO. 7    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States.
NO. 4    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 3    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 5    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence.
NO. 32    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 33    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 35    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 36    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 31    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 60    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 22    The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 53    The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives
NO. 27    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 28    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 16    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 17    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 18    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 19    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 20    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 43    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 25    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 10    The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 62    The Senate
NO. 63    The Senate Continued
NO. 51    The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
NO. 55    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 56    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 75    The Treaty Making Power of the Executive
NO. 9    The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 11    The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
NO. 12    The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue.
NO. 48    These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
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