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NO.
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1
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General Inroduction
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NO.
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2
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Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
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NO.
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3
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The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
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NO.
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4
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The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
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NO.
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5
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The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence.
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NO.
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6
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Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
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NO.
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7
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The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States.
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NO.
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8
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The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
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NO.
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9
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The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
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NO.
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10
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The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
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NO.
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11
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The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
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NO.
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12
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The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue.
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NO.
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13
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Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government.
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NO.
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14
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Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered.
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NO.
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15
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The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
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NO.
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16
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The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
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NO.
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17
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The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
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NO.
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18
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The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
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NO.
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19
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The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
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NO.
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20
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The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
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NO.
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21
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Other Defects of the Present Confederation
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NO.
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22
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The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation
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NO.
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23
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The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
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NO.
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24
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The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
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NO.
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25
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The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
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NO.
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26
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The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
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NO.
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27
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The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
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NO.
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28
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The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
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NO.
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29
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THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy
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NO.
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30
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Concerning the General Power of Taxation
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NO.
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31
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The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
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NO.
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32
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The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
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NO.
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33
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The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
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NO.
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34
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The Same Subject Continued Concerning the General Power of Taxation
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NO.
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35
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The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
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NO.
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36
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The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
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NO.
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37
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Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
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NO.
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38
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The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
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NO.
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39
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The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
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NO.
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40
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The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
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NO.
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41
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General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution
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NO.
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42
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The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
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NO.
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43
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The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
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NO.
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44
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Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
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NO.
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45
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The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
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NO.
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46
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The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
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NO.
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47
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The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
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NO.
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48
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These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
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NO.
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49
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Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
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NO.
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50
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Periodic Appeals to the People Considered
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NO.
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51
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The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
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NO.
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52
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The House of Representatives
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NO.
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53
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The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives
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NO.
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54
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The Apportionment of Members Among the States
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NO.
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55
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The Total Number of the House of Representatives
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NO.
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56
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The Total Number of the House of Representatives
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NO.
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57
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The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
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NO.
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58
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Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
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NO.
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59
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Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
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NO.
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60
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The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
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NO.
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61
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The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
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NO.
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62
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The Senate
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NO.
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63
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The Senate Continued
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NO.
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64
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The Powers of the Senate
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NO.
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65
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The Powers of the Senate Continued
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NO.
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66
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Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
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NO.
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67
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The Executive Department
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NO.
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68
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The Mode of Electing the President
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NO.
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69
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The Real Character of the Executive
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NO.
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70
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The Executive Department Further Considered
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NO.
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71
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The Duration in Office of the Executive.
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NO.
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72
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The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
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NO.
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73
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The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
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NO.
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74
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The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
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Close
End of Federalist Paper No. 74
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FEDERALIST NO. 74
The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
Alexander Hamilton Tuesday March 25, 1788
Author: James Madison
To the People of New York
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THE President of the United States is to be "commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States WHEN CALLED INTO THE ACTUAL SERVICE of the United States."
The propriety of this provision is so evident in itself, and it is, at the same time, so consonant to the precedents of the State constitutions in general, that little need be said to explain or enforce it.
Even those of them which have, in other respects, coupled the chief magistrate with a council, have for the most part concentrated the military authority in him alone.
Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.
The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and employing the common strength, forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority.
"The President may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective officers."
This I consider as a mere redundancy in the plan, as the right for which it provides would result of itself from the office.
He is also to be authorized to grant "reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, EXCEPT IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT."
Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed.
The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.
As the sense of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is undivided, it may be inferred that a single man would be most ready to attend to the force of those motives which might plead for a mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to considerations which were calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance.
The reflection that the fate of a fellow-creature depended on his sole fiat, would naturally inspire scrupulousness and caution; the dread of being accused of weakness or connivance, would beget equal circumspection, though of a different kind.
On the other hand, as men generally derive confidence from their numbers, they might often encourage each other in an act of obduracy, and might be less sensible to the apprehension of suspicion or censure for an injudicious or affected clemency.
On these accounts, one man appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of government, than a body of men.
The expediency of vesting the power of pardoning in the President has, if I mistake not, been only contested in relation to the crime of treason.
This, it has been urged, ought to have depended upon the assent of one, or both, of the branches of the legislative body.
I shall not deny that there are strong reasons to be assigned for requiring in this particular the concurrence of that body, or of a part of it.
As treason is a crime levelled at the immediate being of the society, when the laws have once ascertained the guilt of the offender, there seems a fitness in referring the expediency of an act of mercy towards him to the judgment of the legislature.
And this ought the rather to be the case, as the supposition of the connivance of the Chief Magistrate ought not to be entirely excluded.
But there are also strong objections to such a plan.
It is not to be doubted, that a single man of prudence and good sense is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives which may plead for and against the remission of the punishment, than any numerous body whatever.
It deserves particular attention, that treason will often be connected with seditions which embrace a large proportion of the community; as lately happened in Massachusetts.
In every such case, we might expect to see the representation of the people tainted with the same spirit which had given birth to the offense.
And when parties were pretty equally matched, the secret sympathy of the friends and favorers of the condemned person, availing itself of the good-nature and weakness of others, might frequently bestow impunity where the terror of an example was necessary.
On the other hand, when the sedition had proceeded from causes which had inflamed the resentments of the major party, they might often be found obstinate and inexorable, when policy demanded a conduct of forbearance and clemency.
But the principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in this case to the Chief Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a welltimed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquillity of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards to recall.
The dilatory process of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure, would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the golden opportunity.
The loss of a week, a day, an hour, may sometimes be fatal.
If it should be observed, that a discretionary power, with a view to such contingencies, might be occasionally conferred upon the President, it may be answered in the first place, that it is questionable, whether, in a limited Constitution, that power could be delegated by law; and in the second place, that it would generally be impolitic beforehand to take any step which might hold out the prospect of impunity.
A proceeding of this kind, out of the usual course, would be likely to be construed into an argument of timidity or of weakness, and would have a tendency to embolden guilt.
Beginning of Federalist Paper No. 74
Close
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NO.
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75
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The Treaty Making Power of the Executive
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NO.
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76
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The Appointing Power of the Executive
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NO.
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77
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The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
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NO.
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78
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The Judiciary Department
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NO.
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79
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The Judiciary Department Continued
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NO.
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80
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The Powers of the Judiciary
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NO.
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81
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The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
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NO.
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82
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The Judiciary Continued
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NO.
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83
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The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
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NO.
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84
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Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
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NO.
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85
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Concluding Remarks
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NO.
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449
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