Federalist Papers
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NO. 13    Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government.
NO. 84    Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
NO. 6    Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
NO. 2    Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 37    Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
NO. 30    Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 59    Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 85    Concluding Remarks
NO. 1    General Inroduction
NO. 41    General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution
NO. 49    Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
NO. 58    Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
NO. 66    Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
NO. 14    Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered.
NO. 21    Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 50    Periodic Appeals to the People Considered
NO. 44    Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
NO. 45    The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
NO. 57    The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
NO. 77    The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
NO. 76    The Appointing Power of the Executive
NO. 54    The Apportionment of Members Among the States
NO. 74    The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
NO. 39    The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
NO. 8    The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
NO. 71    The Duration in Office of the Executive.
NO. 67    The Executive Department
NO. 70    The Executive Department Further Considered
NO. 52    The House of Representatives
NO. 26    The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 46    The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
NO. 15    The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 82    The Judiciary Continued
NO. 83    The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
NO. 81    The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
NO. 78    The Judiciary Department
NO. 79    The Judiciary Department Continued
NO. 68    The Mode of Electing the President
NO. 23    The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
NO. 47    The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
NO. 29    THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy
NO. 42    The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 24    The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 40    The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
NO. 80    The Powers of the Judiciary
NO. 64    The Powers of the Senate
NO. 65    The Powers of the Senate Continued
NO. 73    The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
NO. 69    The Real Character of the Executive
NO. 61    The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
NO. 34    The Same Subject Continued Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 72    The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
NO. 38    The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
NO. 7    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States.
NO. 4    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 3    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 5    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence.
NO. 32    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 33    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 35    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 36    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 31    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 60    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 22    The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation
Close
End of Federalist Paper No. 22
FEDERALIST NO. 22
The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation
From the New York Packet     Friday December 14, 1787
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of New York


DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=22- ParaX=1- XthisXParaX=1-
DeB 131 -1-IN ADDITION to the defects already enumerated in the existing federal system, there are others of not less importance, which concur in rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union.

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DeB 131 -1-The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be of the number. DeB 131 -2-The utility of such a power has been anticipated under the first head of our inquiries; and for this reason, as well as from the universal conviction entertained upon the subject, little need be added in this place. DeB 131 -3-It is indeed evident, on the most superficial view, that there is no object, either as it respects the interests of trade or finance, that more strongly demands a federal superintendence. DeB 131 -4-The want of it has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers, and has given occasions of dissatisfaction between the States. DeB 131 -5-No nation acquainted with the nature of our political association would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations with the United States, by which they conceded privileges of any importance to them, while they were apprised that the engagements on the part of the Union might at any moment be violated by its members, and while they found from experience that they might enjoy every advantage they desired in our markets, without granting us any return but such as their momentary convenience might suggest. DeB 131 -6-It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that Mr. Jenkinson, in ushering into the House of Commons a bill for regulating the temporary intercourse between the two countries, should preface its introduction by a declaration that similar provisions in former bills had been found to answer every purpose to the commerce of Great Britain, and that it would be prudent to persist in the plan until it should appear whether the American government was likely or not to acquire greater consistency.[1].

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DeB 131 -1-Several States have endeavored, by separate prohibitions, restrictions, and exclusions, to influence the conduct of that kingdom in this particular, but the want of concert, arising from the want of a general authority and from clashing and dissimilar views in the State, has hitherto frustrated every experiment of the kind, and will continue to do so as long as the same obstacles to a uniformity of measures continue to exist

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DeB 131 -1-The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given just cause of umbrage and complaint to others, and it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if not restrained by a national control, would be multiplied and extended till they became not less serious sources of animosity and discord than injurious impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the Confederacy. DeB 131 -2-"The commerce of the German empire [2] is in continual trammels from the multiplicity of the duties which the several princes and states exact upon the merchandises passing through their territories, by means of which the fine streams and navigable rivers with which Germany is so happily watered are rendered almost useless." DeB 131 -3-Though the genius of the people of this country might never permit this description to be strictly applicable to us, yet we may reasonably expect, from the gradual conflicts of State regulations, that the citizens of each would at length come to be considered and treated by the others in no better light than that of foreigners and aliens.

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DeB 131 -1-The power of raising armies, by the most obvious construction of the articles of the Confederation, is merely a power of making requisitions upon the States for quotas of men. DeB 131 -2-This practice in the course of the late war, was found replete with obstructions to a vigorous and to an economical system of defense. DeB 131 -3-It gave birth to a competition between the States which created a kind of auction for men. DeB 131 -4-In order to furnish the quotas required of them, they outbid each other till bounties grew to an enormous and insupportable size. DeB 131 -5-The hope of a still further increase afforded an inducement to those who were disposed to serve to procrastinate their enlistment, and disinclined them from engaging for any considerable periods. DeB 131 -6-Hence, slow and scanty levies of men, in the most critical emergencies of our affairs; short enlistments at an unparalleled expense; continual fluctuations in the troops, ruinous to their discipline and subjecting the public safety frequently to the perilous crisis of a disbanded army. DeB 131 -7-Hence, also, those oppressive expedients for raising men which were upon several occasions practiced, and which nothing but the enthusiasm of liberty would have induced the people to endure.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=22- ParaX=6- XthisXParaX=6-
DeB 131 -1-This method of raising troops is not more unfriendly to economy and vigor than it is to an equal distribution of the burden. DeB 131 -2-The States near the seat of war, influenced by motives of self-preservation, made efforts to furnish their quotas, which even exceeded their abilities; while those at a distance from danger were, for the most part, as remiss as the others were diligent, in their exertions. DeB 131 -3-The immediate pressure of this inequality was not in this case, as in that of the contributions of money, alleviated by the hope of a final liquidation. DeB 131 -4-The States which did not pay their proportions of money might at least be charged with their deficiencies; but no account could be formed of the deficiencies in the supplies of men. DeB 131 -5-We shall not, however, see much reason to reget the want of this hope, when we consider how little prospect there is, that the most delinquent States will ever be able to make compensation for their pecuniary failures. DeB 131 -6-The system of quotas and requisitions, whether it be applied to men or money, is, in every view, a system of imbecility in the Union, and of inequality and injustice among the members.

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DeB 131 -1-The right of equal suffrage among the States is another exceptionable part of the Confederation. DeB 131 -2-Every idea of proportion and every rule of fair representation conspire to condemn a principle, which gives to Rhode Island an equal weight in the scale of power with Massachusetts, or Connecticut, or New York; and to Deleware an equal voice in the national deliberations with Pennsylvania, or Virginia, or North Carolina. DeB 131 -3-Its operation contradicts the fundamental maxim of republican government, which requires that the sense of the majority should prevail. DeB 131 -4-Sophistry may reply, that sovereigns are equal, and that a majority of the votes of the States will be a majority of confederated America. DeB 131 -5-But this kind of logical legerdemain will never counteract the plain suggestions of justice and common-sense. DeB 131 -6-It may happen that this majority of States is a small minority of the people of America [3]; and two thirds of the people of America could not long be persuaded, upon the credit of artificial distinctions and syllogistic subtleties, to submit their interests to the management and disposal of one third. DeB 131 -7-The larger States would after a while revolt from the idea of receiving the law from the smaller. DeB 131 -8-To acquiesce in such a privation of their due importance in the political scale, would be not merely to be insensible to the love of power, but even to sacrifice the desire of equality. DeB 131 -9-It is neither rational to expect the first, nor just to require the last. DeB 131 -10-The smaller States, considering how peculiarly their safety and welfare depend on union, ought readily to renounce a pretension which, if not relinquished, would prove fatal to its duration.

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DeB 131 -1-It may be objected to this, that not seven but nine States, or two thirds of the whole number, must consent to the most important resolutions; and it may be thence inferred that nine States would always comprehend a majority of the Union. DeB 131 -2-But this does not obviate the impropriety of an equal vote between States of the most unequal dimensions and populousness; nor is the inference accurate in point of fact; for we can enumerate nine States which contain less than a majority of the people [4]; and it is constitutionally possible that these nine may give the vote. DeB 131 -3-Besides, there are matters of considerable moment determinable by a bare majority; and there are others, concerning which doubts have been entertained, which, if interpreted in favor of the sufficiency of a vote of seven States, would extend its operation to interests of the first magnitude. DeB 131 -4-In addition to this, it is to be observed that there is a probability of an increase in the number of States, and no provision for a proportional augmentation of the ratio of votes.

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DeB 131 -1-But this is not all: what at first sight may seem a remedy, is, in reality, a poison. DeB 131 -2-To give a minority a negative upon the majority (which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a decision), is, in its tendency, to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser. DeB 131 -3-Congress, from the nonattendance of a few States, have been frequently in the situation of a Polish diet, where a single VOTE has been sufficient to put a stop to all their movements. DeB 131 -4-A sixtieth part of the Union, which is about the proportion of Delaware and Rhode Island, has several times been able to oppose an entire bar to its operations. DeB 131 -5-This is one of those refinements which, in practice, has an effect the reverse of what is expected from it in theory. DeB 131 -6-The necessity of unanimity in public bodies, or of something approaching towards it, has been founded upon a supposition that it would contribute to security. DeB 131 -7-But its real operation is to embarrass the administration, to destroy the energy of the government, and to substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt junto, to the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority. DeB 131 -8-In those emergencies of a nation, in which the goodness or badness, the weakness or strength of its government, is of the greatest importance, there is commonly a necessity for action. DeB 131 -9-The public business must, in some way or other, go forward. DeB 131 -10-If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a majority, respecting the best mode of conducting it, the majority, in order that something may be done, must conform to the views of the minority; and thus the sense of the smaller number will overrule that of the greater, and give a tone to the national proceedings. DeB 131 -11-Hence, tedious delays; continual negotiation and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the public good. DeB 131 -12-And yet, in such a system, it is even happy when such compromises can take place: for upon some occasions things will not admit of accommodation; and then the measures of government must be injuriously suspended, or fatally defeated. DeB 131 -13-It is often, by the impracticability of obtaining the concurrence of the necessary number of votes, kept in a state of inaction. DeB 131 -14-Its situation must always savor of weakness, sometimes border upon anarchy.

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DeB 131 -1-It is not difficult to discover, that a principle of this kind gives greater scope to foreign corruption, as well as to domestic faction, than that which permits the sense of the majority to decide; though the contrary of this has been presumed. DeB 131 -2-The mistake has proceeded from not attending with due care to the mischiefs that may be occasioned by obstructing the progress of government at certain critical seasons. DeB 131 -3-When the concurrence of a large number is required by the Constitution to the doing of any national act, we are apt to rest satisfied that all is safe, because nothing improper will be likely TO BE DONE, but we forget how much good may be prevented, and how much ill may be produced, by the power of hindering the doing what may be necessary, and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to stand at particular periods.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=22- ParaX=11- XthisXParaX=11-
DeB 131 -1-Suppose, for instance, we were engaged in a war, in conjunction with one foreign nation, against another. DeB 131 -2-Suppose the necessity of our situation demanded peace, and the interest or ambition of our ally led him to seek the prosecution of the war, with views that might justify us in making separate terms. DeB 131 -3-In such a state of things, this ally of ours would evidently find it much easier, by his bribes and intrigues, to tie up the hands of government from making peace, where two thirds of all the votes were requisite to that object, than where a simple majority would suffice. DeB 131 -4-In the first case, he would have to corrupt a smaller number; in the last, a greater number. DeB 131 -5-Upon the same principle, it would be much easier for a foreign power with which we were at war to perplex our councils and embarrass our exertions. DeB 131 -6-And, in a commercial view, we may be subjected to similar inconveniences. DeB 131 -7-A nation, with which we might have a treaty of commerce, could with much greater facility prevent our forming a connection with her competitor in trade, though such a connection should be ever so beneficial to ourselves.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=22- ParaX=12- XthisXParaX=12-
DeB 131 -1-Evils of this description ought not to be regarded as imaginary. DeB 131 -2-One of the weak sides of republics, among their numerous advantages, is that they afford too easy an inlet to foreign corruption. DeB 131 -3-An hereditary monarch, though often disposed to sacrifice his subjects to his ambition, has so great a personal interest in the government and in the external glory of the nation, that it is not easy for a foreign power to give him an equivalent for what he would sacrifice by treachery to the state. DeB 131 -4-The world has accordingly been witness to few examples of this species of royal prostitution, though there have been abundant specimens of every other kind.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=22- ParaX=13- XthisXParaX=13-
DeB 131 -1-In republics, persons elevated from the mass of the community, by the suffrages of their fellow-citizens, to stations of great pre-eminence and power, may find compensations for betraying their trust, which, to any but minds animated and guided by superior virtue, may appear to exceed the proportion of interest they have in the common stock, and to overbalance the obligations of duty. DeB 131 -2-Hence it is that history furnishes us with so many mortifying examples of the prevalency of foreign corruption in republican governments. DeB 131 -3-How much this contributed to the ruin of the ancient commonwealths has been already delineated. DeB 131 -4-It is well known that the deputies of the United Provinces have, in various instances, been purchased by the emissaries of the neighboring kingdoms. DeB 131 -5-The Earl of Chesterfield (if my memory serves me right), in a letter to his court, intimates that his success in an important negotiation must depend on his obtaining a major's commission for one of those deputies. DeB 131 -6-And in Sweden the parties were alternately bought by France and England in so barefaced and notorious a manner that it excited universal disgust in the nation, and was a principal cause that the most limited monarch in Europe, in a single day, without tumult, violence, or opposition, became one of the most absolute and uncontrolled.

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DeB 131 -1-A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Confederation remains yet to be mentioned, the want of a judiciary power. DeB 131 -2-Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation. DeB 131 -3-The treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law of the land. DeB 131 -4-Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations. DeB 131 -5-To produce uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted, in the last resort, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL. DeB 131 -6-And this tribunal ought to be instituted under the same authority which forms the treaties themselves. DeB 131 -7-These ingredients are both indispensable. DeB 131 -8-If there is in each State a court of final jurisdiction, there may be as many different final determinations on the same point as there are courts. DeB 131 -9-There are endless diversities in the opinions of men. DeB 131 -10-We often see not only different courts but the judges of the came court differing from each other. DeB 131 -11-To avoid the confusion which would unavoidably result from the contradictory decisions of a number of independent judicatories, all nations have found it necessary to establish one court paramount to the rest, possessing a general superintendence, and authorized to settle and declare in the last resort a uniform rule of civil justice.

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DeB 131 -1-This is the more necessary where the frame of the government is so compounded that the laws of the whole are in danger of being contravened by the laws of the parts. DeB 131 -2-In this case, if the particular tribunals are invested with a right of ultimate jurisdiction, besides the contradictions to be expected from difference of opinion, there will be much to fear from the bias of local views and prejudices, and from the interference of local regulations. DeB 131 -3-As often as such an interference was to happen, there would be reason to apprehend that the provisions of the particular laws might be preferred to those of the general laws; for nothing is more natural to men in office than to look with peculiar deference towards that authority to which they owe their official existence. DeB 131 -4-The treaties of the United States, under the present Constitution, are liable to the infractions of thirteen different legislatures, and as many different courts of final jurisdiction, acting under the authority of those legislatures. DeB 131 -5-The faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole Union, are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of every member of which it is composed. DeB 131 -6-Is it possible that foreign nations can either respect or confide in such a government? DeB 131 -7-Is it possible that the people of America will longer consent to trust their honor, their happiness, their safety, on so precarious a foundation?

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DeB 131 -1-In this review of the Confederation, I have confined myself to the exhibition of its most material defects; passing over those imperfections in its details by which even a great part of the power intended to be conferred upon it has been in a great measure rendered abortive. DeB 131 -2-It must be by this time evident to all men of reflection, who can divest themselves of the prepossessions of preconceived opinions, that it is a system so radically vicious and unsound, as to admit not of amendment but by an entire change in its leading features and characters.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=22- ParaX=17- XthisXParaX=17-
DeB 131 -1-The organization of Congress is itself utterly improper for the exercise of those powers which are necessary to be deposited in the Union. DeB 131 -2-A single assembly may be a proper receptacle of those slender, or rather fettered, authorities, which have been heretofore delegated to the federal head; but it would be inconsistent with all the principles of good government, to intrust it with those additional powers which, even the moderate and more rational adversaries of the proposed Constitution admit, ought to reside in the United States. DeB 131 -3-If that plan should not be adopted, and if the necessity of the Union should be able to withstand the ambitious aims of those men who may indulge magnificent schemes of personal aggrandizement from its dissolution, the probability would be, that we should run into the project of conferring supplementary powers upon Congress, as they are now constituted; and either the machine, from the intrinsic feebleness of its structure, will moulder into pieces, in spite of our ill-judged efforts to prop it; or, by successive augmentations of its force an energy, as necessity might prompt, we shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the most important prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus entail upon our posterity one of the most execrable forms of government that human infatuation ever contrived. DeB 131 -4-Thus, we should create in reality that very tyranny which the adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to be, solicitous to avert.

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DeB 131 -1-It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing federal system, that it never had a ratification by the PEOPLE. DeB 131 -2-Resting on no better foundation than the consent of the several legislatures, it has been exposed to frequent and intricate questions concerning the validity of its powers, and has, in some instances, given birth to the enormous doctrine of a right of legislative repeal. DeB 131 -3-Owing its ratification to the law of a State, it has been contended that the same authority might repeal the law by which it was ratified. DeB 131 -4-However gross a heresy it may be to maintain that a PARTY to a COMPACT has a right to revoke that COMPACT, the doctrine itself has had respectable advocates. DeB 131 -5-The possibility of a question of this nature proves the necessity of laying the foundations of our national government deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated authority. DeB 131 -6-The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. DeB 131 -7-The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority.

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DeB 131 -1-1. This, as nearly as I can recollect, was the sense of his speech on introducing the last bill.

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DeB 131 -1-2. Encyclopedia, article "Empire".

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DeB 131 -1-3. New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, South Carolina, and Maryland are a majority of the whole number of the States, but they do not contain one third of the people.

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DeB 131 -1-4. Add New York and Connecticut to the foregoing seven, and they will be less than a majority.

Beginning of Federalist Paper No. 22

Close

NO. 53    The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives
NO. 27    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 28    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 16    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 17    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 18    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 19    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 20    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 43    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 25    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 10    The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 62    The Senate
NO. 63    The Senate Continued
NO. 51    The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
NO. 55    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 56    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 75    The Treaty Making Power of the Executive
NO. 9    The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 11    The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
NO. 12    The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue.
NO. 48    These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
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