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NO. 1 General Introduction
NO. 2 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 3 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 4 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 5 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence.
NO. 6 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States.
NO. 7 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States.
NO. 8 The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
NO. 9 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 10 The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 11 The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
NO. 12 The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue.
NO. 13 Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government.
NO. 14 Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered.
NO. 15 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 16 The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 17 The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 18 The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 19 The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 20 The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 21 Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 22 The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 23 The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
NO. 24 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 25 The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 26 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 27 The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 28 The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 29 THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy
NO. 30 Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 31 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 32 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 33 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 34 The Same Subject Continued Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 35 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 36 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 37 Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
NO. 38 The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
NO. 39 The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
NO. 40 The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
NO. 41 General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution
NO. 42 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 43 The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 44 Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
NO. 45 The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
NO. 46 The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
NO. 47 The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
NO. 48 These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
NO. 49 Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
NO. 50 Periodic Appeals to the People Considered
NO. 51 The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
NO. 52 The House of Representatives
NO. 53 The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives
NO. 54 The Apportionment of Members Among the States
NO. 55 The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 56 The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 57 The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
NO. 58 Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
NO. 59 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 60 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 61 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
NO. 62 The Senate
NO. 63 The Senate Continued
NO. 64 The Powers of the Senate
NO. 65 The Powers of the Senate Continued
NO. 66 Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
NO. 67 The Executive Department
NO. 68 The Mode of Electing the President
NO. 69 The Real Character of the Executive
NO. 70 The Executive Department Further Considered
NO. 71 The Duration in Office of the Executive.
NO. 72 The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
NO. 73 The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
NO. 74 The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
NO. 75 The Treaty Making Power of the Executive
NO. 76 The Appointing Power of the Executive
NO. 77 The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
NO. 78 The Judiciary Department
NO. 79 The Judiciary Department Continued
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End of Federalist Paper No. 79
FEDERALIST NO. 79
The Judiciary Department Continued
From McLEAN'S Edition, New York     Wednesday May 28, 1788
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of New York


      1: 1   NEXT to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. 2   The remark made in relation to the President is equally applicable here. 3   In the general course of human nature, A POWER OVER A MAN's SUBSISTENCE AMOUNTS TO A POWER OVER HIS WILL. 4   And we can never hope to see realized in practice, the complete separation of the judicial from the legislative power, in any system which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary resources on the occasional grants of the latter. 5   The enlightened friends to good government in every State, have seen cause to lament the want of precise and explicit precautions in the State constitutions on this head. 6   Some of these indeed have declared that PERMANENT [1] salaries should be established for the judges; but the experiment has in some instances shown that such expressions are not sufficiently definite to preclude legislative evasions. 7   Something still more positive and unequivocal has been evinced to be requisite. 8   The plan of the convention accordingly has provided that the judges of the United States "shall at STATED TIMES receive for their services a compensation which shall not be DIMINISHED during their continuance in office."

      2: 1   This, all circumstances considered, is the most eligible provision that could have been devised. 2   It will readily be understood that the fluctuations in the value of money and in the state of society rendered a fixed rate of compensation in the Constitution inadmissible. 3   What might be extravagant to-day, might in half a century become penurious and inadequate. 4   It was therefore necessary to leave it to the discretion of the legislature to vary its provisions in conformity to the variations in circumstances, yet under such restrictions as to put it out of the power of that body to change the condition of the individual for the worse. 5   A man may then be sure of the ground upon which he stands, and can never be deterred from his duty by the apprehension of being placed in a less eligible situation. 6   The clause which has been quoted combines both advantages. 7   The salaries of judicial officers may from time to time be altered, as occasion shall require, yet so as never to lessen the allowance with which any particular judge comes into office, in respect to him. 8   It will be observed that a difference has been made by the convention between the compensation of the President and of the judges, That of the former can neither be increased nor diminished; that of the latter can only not be diminished. 9   This probably arose from the difference in the duration of the respective offices. 10   As the President is to be elected for no more than four years, it can rarely happen that an adequate salary, fixed at the commencement of that period, will not continue to be such to its end. 11   But with regard to the judges, who, if they behave properly, will be secured in their places for life, it may well happen, especially in the early stages of the government, that a stipend, which would be very sufficient at their first appointment, would become too small in the progress of their service.

      3: 1   This provision for the support of the judges bears every mark of prudence and efficacy; and it may be safely affirmed that, together with the permanent tenure of their offices, it affords a better prospect of their independence than is discoverable in the constitutions of any of the States in regard to their own judges.

      4: 1   The precautions for their responsibility are comprised in the article respecting impeachments. 2   They are liable to be impeached for malconduct by the House of Representatives, and tried by the Senate; and, if convicted, may be dismissed from office, and disqualified for holding any other. 3   This is the only provision on the point which is consistent with the necessary independence of the judicial character, and is the only one which we find in our own Constitution in respect to our own judges.

      5: 1   The want of a provision for removing the judges on account of inability has been a subject of complaint. 2   But all considerate men will be sensible that such a provision would either not be practiced upon or would be more liable to abuse than calculated to answer any good purpose. 3   The mensuration of the faculties of the mind has, I believe, no place in the catalogue of known arts. 4   An attempt to fix the boundary between the regions of ability and inability, would much oftener give scope to personal and party attachments and enmities than advance the interests of justice or the public good. 5   

      6: 1   The constitution of New York, to avoid investigations that must forever be vague and dangerous, has taken a particular age as the criterion of inability. 2   No man can be a judge beyond sixty. 3   I believe there are few at present who do not disapprove of this provision. 4   There is no station, in relation to which it is less proper than to that of a judge. 5   The deliberating and comparing faculties generally preserve their strength much beyond that period in men who survive it; and when, in addition to this circumstance, we consider how few there are who outlive the season of intellectual vigor, and how improbable it is that any considerable portion of the bench, whether more or less numerous, should be in such a situation at the same time, we shall be ready to conclude that limitations of this sort have little to recommend them. 6   In a republic, where fortunes are not affluent, and pensions not expedient, the dismission of men from stations in which they have served their country long and usefully, on which they depend for subsistence, and from which it will be too late to resort to any other occupation for a livelihood, ought to have some better apology to humanity than is to be found in the imaginary danger of a superannuated bench.

      901: 1   1. Vide "Constitution of Massachusetts," chapter 2, section I, article 13.
Beginning of Federalist Paper No. 79

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NO. 80 The Powers of the Judiciary
NO. 81 The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
NO. 82 The Judiciary Continued
NO. 83 The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
NO. 84 Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
NO. 85 Concluding Remarks