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NO. 13 Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government.
NO. 84 Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
NO. 6 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States.
NO. 2 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
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End of Federalist Paper No. 2
FEDERALIST NO. 2
Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
For the Independent Journal     Wednesday October 31, 1787
Author: Jay
To the People of New York


      1: 1   WHEN the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of the most important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it, will be evident. 4   "We most earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present and future happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION".

      2: 1   Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite powers. 2   It is well worthy of consideration therefore, whether it would conduce more to the interest of the people of America that they should, to all general purposes, be one nation, under one federal government, or that they should divide themselves into separate confederacies, and give to the head of each the same kind of powers which they are advised to place in one national government.

      3: 1   It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion that the prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest citizens have been constantly directed to that object. 2   But politicians now appear, who insist that this opinion is erroneous, and that instead of looking for safety and happiness in union, we ought to seek it in a division of the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties. 3   However extraordinary this new doctrine may appear, it nevertheless has its advocates; and certain characters who were much opposed to it formerly, are at present of the number. 4   Whatever may be the arguments or inducements which have wrought this change in the sentiments and declarations of these gentlemen, it certainly would not be wise in the people at large to adopt these new political tenets without being fully convinced that they are founded in truth and sound policy.

      4: 1   It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America was not composed of detached and distant territories, but that one connected, fertile, widespreading country was the portion of our western sons of liberty. 2   Providence has in a particular manner blessed it with a variety of soils and productions, and watered it with innumerable streams, for the delight and accommodation of its inhabitants. 3   A succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain round its borders, as if to bind it together; while the most noble rivers in the world, running at convenient distances, present them with highways for the easy communication of friendly aids, and the mutual transportation and exchange of their various commodities.

      5: 1   With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people--a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and independence.

      6: 1   This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.

      7: 1   Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and denominations of men among us. 2   To all general purposes we have uniformly been one people each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and protection. 3   As a nation we have made peace and war; as a nation we have vanquished our common enemies; as a nation we have formed alliances, and made treaties, and entered into various compacts and conventions with foreign states.

      8: 1   A strong sense of the value and blessings of union induced the people, at a very early period, to institute a federal government to preserve and perpetuate it. 2   They formed it almost as soon as they had a political existence; nay, at a time when their habitations were in flames, when many of their citizens were bleeding, and when the progress of hostility and desolation left little room for those calm and mature inquiries and reflections which must ever precede the formation of a wise and wellbalanced government for a free people. 3   It is not to be wondered at, that a government instituted in times so inauspicious, should on experiment be found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it was intended to answer.

      9: 1   This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects. 2   Still continuing no less attached to union than enamored of liberty, they observed the danger which immediately threatened the former and more remotely the latter; and being pursuaded that ample security for both could only be found in a national government more wisely framed, they as with one voice, convened the late convention at Philadelphia, to take that important subject under consideration.

      10: 1   This convention composed of men who possessed the confidence of the people, and many of whom had become highly distinguished by their patriotism, virtue and wisdom, in times which tried the minds and hearts of men, undertook the arduous task. 2   In the mild season of peace, with minds unoccupied by other subjects, they passed many months in cool, uninterrupted, and daily consultation; and finally, without having been awed by power, or influenced by any passions except love for their country, they presented and recommended to the people the plan produced by their joint and very unanimous councils.

      11: 1   Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only RECOMMENDED, not imposed, yet let it be remembered that it is neither recommended to BLIND approbation, nor to BLIND reprobation; but to that sedate and candid consideration which the magnitude and importance of the subject demand, and which it certainly ought to receive. 2   But this (as was remarked in the foregoing number of this paper) is more to be wished than expected, that it may be so considered and examined. 3   Experience on a former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine in such hopes. 4   It is not yet forgotten that well-grounded apprehensions of imminent danger induced the people of America to form the memorable Congress of 1774. 5   That body recommended certain measures to their constituents, and the event proved their wisdom; yet it is fresh in our memories how soon the press began to teem with pamphlets and weekly papers against those very measures. 6   Not only many of the officers of government, who obeyed the dictates of personal interest, but others, from a mistaken estimate of consequences, or the undue influence of former attachments, or whose ambition aimed at objects which did not correspond with the public good, were indefatigable in their efforts to pursuade the people to reject the advice of that patriotic Congress. 7   Many, indeed, were deceived and deluded, but the great majority of the people reasoned and decided judiciously; and happy they are in reflecting that they did so.

      12: 1   They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and experienced men. 2   That, being convened from different parts of the country, they brought with them and communicated to each other a variety of useful information. 3   That, in the course of the time they passed together in inquiring into and discussing the true interests of their country, they must have acquired very accurate knowledge on that head. 4   That they were individually interested in the public liberty and prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their inclination than their duty to recommend only such measures as, after the most mature deliberation, they really thought prudent and advisable. 6   It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or four distinct independent companies.

      13: 1   These and similar considerations then induced the people to rely greatly on the judgment and integrity of the Congress; and they took their advice, notwithstanding the various arts and endeavors used to deter them from it. 2   But if the people at large had reason to confide in the men of that Congress, few of whom had been fully tried or generally known, still greater reason have they now to respect the judgment and advice of the convention, for it is well known that some of the most distinguished members of that Congress, who have been since tried and justly approved for patriotism and abilities, and who have grown old in acquiring political information, were also members of this convention, and carried into it their accumulated knowledge and experience.

      14: 1   It is worthy of remark that not only the first, but every succeeding Congress, as well as the late convention, have invariably joined with the people in thinking that the prosperity of America depended on its Union. 2   To preserve and perpetuate it was the great object of the people in forming that convention, and it is also the great object of the plan which the convention has advised them to adopt. 3   With what propriety, therefore, or for what good purposes, are attempts at this particular period made by some men to depreciate the importance of the Union? 4   Or why is it suggested that three or four confederacies would be better than one? 5   I am persuaded in my own mind that the people have always thought right on this subject, and that their universal and uniform attachment to the cause of the Union rests on great and weighty reasons, which I shall endeavor to develop and explain in some ensuing papers. 6   They who promote the idea of substituting a number of distinct confederacies in the room of the plan of the convention, seem clearly to foresee that the rejection of it would put the continuance of the Union in the utmost jeopardy. 7   That certainly would be the case, and I sincerely wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every good citizen, that whenever the dissolution of the Union arrives, America will have reason to exclaim, in the words of the poet: "FAREWELL! A LONG FAREWELL TO ALL MY GREATNESS".
Beginning of Federalist Paper No. 2

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NO. 37 Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
NO. 30 Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 59 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 85 Concluding Remarks
NO. 1 General Introduction
NO. 41 General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution
NO. 49 Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
NO. 58 Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
NO. 66 Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
NO. 14 Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered.
NO. 21 Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 50 Periodic Appeals to the People Considered
NO. 44 Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
NO. 45 The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
NO. 57 The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
NO. 77 The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
NO. 76 The Appointing Power of the Executive
NO. 54 The Apportionment of Members Among the States
NO. 74 The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
NO. 39 The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
NO. 8 The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
NO. 71 The Duration in Office of the Executive.
NO. 67 The Executive Department
NO. 70 The Executive Department Further Considered
NO. 52 The House of Representatives
NO. 26 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 46 The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
NO. 15 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 82 The Judiciary Continued
NO. 83 The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
NO. 81 The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
NO. 78 The Judiciary Department
NO. 79 The Judiciary Department Continued
NO. 68 The Mode of Electing the President
NO. 23 The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
NO. 47 The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
NO. 29 THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy
NO. 42 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 24 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 40 The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
NO. 80 The Powers of the Judiciary
NO. 64 The Powers of the Senate
NO. 65 The Powers of the Senate Continued
NO. 73 The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
NO. 69 The Real Character of the Executive
NO. 61 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
NO. 34 The Same Subject Continued Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 72 The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
NO. 38 The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
NO. 7 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States.
NO. 4 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 3 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 5 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence.
NO. 32 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 33 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 35 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 36 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 31 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 60 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 22 The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 53 The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives
NO. 27 The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 28 The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 16 The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 17 The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 18 The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 19 The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 20 The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 43 The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 25 The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 10 The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 62 The Senate
NO. 63 The Senate Continued
NO. 51 The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
NO. 55 The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 56 The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 75 The Treaty Making Power of the Executive
NO. 9 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 11 The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
NO. 12 The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue.
NO. 48 These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other


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