Federalist Papers
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NO. 13    Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government.
NO. 84    Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
NO. 6    Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
NO. 2    Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 37    Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
NO. 30    Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 59    Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 85    Concluding Remarks
NO. 1    General Inroduction
NO. 41    General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution
NO. 49    Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
NO. 58    Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
NO. 66    Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
NO. 14    Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered.
NO. 21    Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 50    Periodic Appeals to the People Considered
NO. 44    Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
NO. 45    The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
NO. 57    The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
NO. 77    The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
NO. 76    The Appointing Power of the Executive
NO. 54    The Apportionment of Members Among the States
NO. 74    The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
NO. 39    The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
NO. 8    The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
NO. 71    The Duration in Office of the Executive.
NO. 67    The Executive Department
NO. 70    The Executive Department Further Considered
NO. 52    The House of Representatives
NO. 26    The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 46    The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
NO. 15    The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 82    The Judiciary Continued
NO. 83    The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
NO. 81    The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
NO. 78    The Judiciary Department
NO. 79    The Judiciary Department Continued
NO. 68    The Mode of Electing the President
NO. 23    The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
NO. 47    The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
NO. 29    THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy
NO. 42    The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 24    The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 40    The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
NO. 80    The Powers of the Judiciary
NO. 64    The Powers of the Senate
NO. 65    The Powers of the Senate Continued
NO. 73    The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
NO. 69    The Real Character of the Executive
NO. 61    The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
NO. 34    The Same Subject Continued Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 72    The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
NO. 38    The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
NO. 7    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States.
NO. 4    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 3    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 5    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence.
NO. 32    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 33    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 35    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 36    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 31    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 60    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 22    The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 53    The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives
NO. 27    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 28    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 16    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 17    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 18    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 19    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 20    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 43    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 25    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
Close
End of Federalist Paper No. 25
FEDERALIST NO. 25
The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
From the NewYork Packet     Friday December 21, 1787
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of New York


DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=25- ParaX=1- XthisXParaX=1-
DeB 131 -1-IT MAY perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding number ought to be provided for by the State governments, under the direction of the Union. DeB 131 -2-But this would be, in reality, an inversion of the primary principle of our political association, as it would in practice transfer the care of the common defense from the federal head to the individual members: a project oppressive to some States, dangerous to all, and baneful to the Confederacy.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=25- ParaX=2- XthisXParaX=2-
DeB 131 -1-The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our neighborhood do not border on particular States, but encircle the Union from Maine to Georgia. DeB 131 -2-The danger, though in different degrees, is therefore common. DeB 131 -3-And the means of guarding against it ought, in like manner, to be the objects of common councils and of a common treasury. DeB 131 -4-It happens that some States, from local situation, are more directly exposed. DeB 131 -5-New York is of this class. DeB 131 -6-Upon the plan of separate provisions, New York would have to sustain the whole weight of the establishments requisite to her immediate safety, and to the mediate or ultimate protection of her neighbors. DeB 131 -7-This would neither be equitable as it respected New York nor safe as it respected the other States. DeB 131 -8-Various inconveniences would attend such a system. DeB 131 -9-The States, to whose lot it might fall to support the necessary establishments, would be as little able as willing, for a considerable time to come, to bear the burden of competent provisions. DeB 131 -10-The security of all would thus be subjected to the parsimony, improvidence, or inability of a part. DeB 131 -11-If the resources of such part becoming more abundant and extensive, its provisions should be proportionally enlarged, the other States would quickly take the alarm at seeing the whole military force of the Union in the hands of two or three of its members, and those probably amongst the most powerful. DeB 131 -12-They would each choose to have some counterpoise, and pretenses could easily be contrived. DeB 131 -13-In this situation, military establishments, nourished by mutual jealousy, would be apt to swell beyond their natural or proper size; and being at the separate disposal of the members, they would be engines for the abridgment or demolition of the national authcrity.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=25- ParaX=3- XthisXParaX=3-
DeB 131 -1-Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition that the State governments will too naturally be prone to a rivalship with that of the Union, the foundation of which will be the love of power; and that in any contest between the federal head and one of its members the people will be most apt to unite with their local government. DeB 131 -2-If, in addition to this immense advantage, the ambition of the members should be stimulated by the separate and independent possession of military forces, it would afford too strong a temptation and too great a facility to them to make enterprises upon, and finally to subvert, the constitutional authority of the Union. DeB 131 -3-On the other hand, the liberty of the people would be less safe in this state of things than in that which left the national forces in the hands of the national government. DeB 131 -4-As far as an army may be considered as a dangerous weapon of power, it had better be in those hands of which the people are most likely to be jealous than in those of which they are least likely to be jealous. DeB 131 -5-For it is a truth, which the experience of ages has attested, that the people are always most in danger when the means of injuring their rights are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the least suspicion.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=25- ParaX=4- XthisXParaX=4-
DeB 131 -1-The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware of the danger to the Union from the separate possession of military forces by the States, have, in express terms, prohibited them from having either ships or troops, unless with the consent of Congress. DeB 131 -2-The truth is, that the existence of a federal government and military establishments under State authority are not less at variance with each other than a due supply of the federal treasury and the system of quotas and requisitions.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=25- ParaX=5- XthisXParaX=5-
DeB 131 -1-There are other lights besides those already taken notice of, in which the impropriety of restraints on the discretion of the national legislature will be equally manifest. DeB 131 -2-The design of the objection, which has been mentioned, is to preclude standing armies in time of peace, though we have never been informed how far it is designed the prohibition should extend; whether to raising armies as well as to KEEPING THEM UP in a season of tranquillity or not. DeB 131 -3-If it be confined to the latter it will have no precise signification, and it will be ineffectual for the purpose intended. DeB 131 -4-When armies are once raised what shall be denominated "keeping them up," contrary to the sense of the Constitution? DeB 131 -5-What time shall be requisite to ascertain the violation? DeB 131 -6-Shall it be a week, a month, a year? DeB 131 -7-Or shall we say they may be continued as long as the danger which occasioned their being raised continues? DeB 131 -8-This would be to admit that they might be kept up IN TIME OF PEACE, against threatening or impending danger, which would be at once to deviate from the literal meaning of the prohibition, and to introduce an extensive latitude of construction. DeB 131 -9-Who shall judge of the continuance of the danger? DeB 131 -10-This must undoubtedly be submitted to the national government, and the matter would then be brought to this issue, that the national government, to provide against apprehended danger, might in the first instance raise troops, and might afterwards keep them on foot as long as they supposed the peace or safety of the community was in any degree of jeopardy. DeB 131 -11-It is easy to perceive that a discretion so latitudinary as this would afford ample room for eluding the force of the provision.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=25- ParaX=6- XthisXParaX=6-
DeB 131 -1-The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can only be founded on the supposed probability, or at least possibility, of a combination between the executive and the legislative, in some scheme of usurpation. DeB 131 -2-Should this at any time happen, how easy would it be to fabricate pretenses of approaching danger! Indian hostilities, instigated by Spain or Britain, would always be at hand. DeB 131 -3-Provocations to produce the desired appearances might even be given to some foreign power, and appeased again by timely concessions. DeB 131 -4-If we can reasonably presume such a combination to have been formed, and that the enterprise is warranted by a sufficient prospect of success, the army, when once raised, from whatever cause, or on whatever pretext, may be applied to the execution of the project.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=25- ParaX=7- XthisXParaX=7-
DeB 131 -1-If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend the prohibition to the RAISING of armies in time of peace, the United States would then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet seen, that of a nation incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare for defense, before it was actually invaded. DeB 131 -2-As the ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an enemy within our territories must be waited for, as the legal warrant to the government to begin its levies of men for the protection of the State. DeB 131 -3-We must receive the blow, before we could even prepare to return it. DeB 131 -4-All that kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger, and meet the gathering storm, must be abstained from, as contrary to the genuine maxims of a free government. DeB 131 -5-We must expose our property and liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders, and invite them by our weakness to seize the naked and defenseless prey, because we are afraid that rulers, created by our choice, dependent on our will, might endanger that liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to its preservation.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=25- ParaX=8- XthisXParaX=8-
DeB 131 -1-Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its natural bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the national defense. DeB 131 -2-This doctrine, in substance, had like to have lost us our independence. DeB 131 -3-It cost millions to the United States that might have been saved. DeB 131 -4-The facts which, from our own experience, forbid a reliance of this kind, are too recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. DeB 131 -5-The steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind. DeB 131 -6-Considerations of economy, not less than of stability and vigor, confirm this position. DeB 131 -7-The American militia, in the course of the late war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal monuments to their fame; but the bravest of them feel and know that the liberty of their country could not have been established by their efforts alone, however great and valuable they were. DeB 131 -8-War, like most other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perserverance, by time, and by practice.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=25- ParaX=9- XthisXParaX=9-
DeB 131 -1-All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural and experienced course of human affairs, defeats itself. DeB 131 -2-Pennsylvania, at this instant, affords an example of the truth of this remark. DeB 131 -3-The Bill of Rights of that State declares that standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be kept up in time of peace. DeB 131 -4-Pennsylvania, nevertheless, in a time of profound peace, from the existence of partial disorders in one or two of her counties, has resolved to raise a body of troops; and in all probability will keep them up as long as there is any appearance of danger to the public peace. DeB 131 -5-The conduct of Massachusetts affords a lesson on the same subject, though on different ground. DeB 131 -6-That State (without waiting for the sanction of Congress, as the articles of the Confederation require) was compelled to raise troops to quell a domestic insurrection, and still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a revival of the spirit of revolt. DeB 131 -7-The particular constitution of Massachusetts opposed no obstacle to the measure; but the instance is still of use to instruct us that cases are likely to occur under our government, as well as under those of other nations, which will sometimes render a military force in time of peace essential to the security of the society, and that it is therefore improper in this respect to control the legislative discretion. DeB 131 -8-It also teaches us, in its application to the United States, how little the rights of a feeble government are likely to be respected, even by its own constituents. DeB 131 -9-And it teaches us, in addition to the rest, how unequal parchment provisions are to a struggle with public necessity.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=25- ParaX=10- XthisXParaX=10-
DeB 131 -1-It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth, that the post of admiral should not be conferred twice on the same person. DeB 131 -2-The Peloponnesian confederates, having suffered a severe defeat at sea from the Athenians, demanded Lysander, who had before served with success in that capacity, to command the combined fleets. DeB 131 -3-The Lacedaemonians, to gratify their allies, and yet preserve the semblance of an adherence to their ancient institutions, had recourse to the flimsy subterfuge of investing Lysander with the real power of admiral, under the nominal title of vice-admiral. DeB 131 -4-This instance is selected from among a multitude that might be cited to confirm the truth already advanced and illustrated by domestic examples; which is, that nations pay little regard to rules and maxims calculated in their very nature to run counter to the necessities of society. DeB 131 -5-Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering the government with restrictions that cannot be observed, because they know that every breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.

Beginning of Federalist Paper No. 25

Close

NO. 10    The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 62    The Senate
NO. 63    The Senate Continued
NO. 51    The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
NO. 55    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 56    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 75    The Treaty Making Power of the Executive
NO. 9    The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 11    The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
NO. 12    The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue.
NO. 48    These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
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