Federalist Papers
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NO. 1    General Inroduction
NO. 2    Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 3    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 4    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 5    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence.
NO. 6    Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
NO. 7    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States.
NO. 8    The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
NO. 9    The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 10    The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 11    The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
NO. 12    The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue.
NO. 13    Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government.
NO. 14    Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered.
NO. 15    The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 16    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 17    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 18    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 19    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 20    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 21    Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 22    The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 23    The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
NO. 24    The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 25    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 26    The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 27    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 28    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 29    THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy
NO. 30    Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 31    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 32    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 33    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 34    The Same Subject Continued Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 35    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 36    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 37    Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
NO. 38    The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
NO. 39    The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
NO. 40    The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
NO. 41    General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution
NO. 42    The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 43    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 44    Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
NO. 45    The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
NO. 46    The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
NO. 47    The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
NO. 48    These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
NO. 49    Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
NO. 50    Periodic Appeals to the People Considered
NO. 51    The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
NO. 52    The House of Representatives
NO. 53    The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives
Close
End of Federalist Paper No. 53
FEDERALIST NO. 53
The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives
From the New York Packet     Tuesday February 12, 1788
Author: Alexander Hamilton or James Madison
To the People of New York


DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=53- ParaX=1- XthisXParaX=1-
DeB 131 -1-I SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, "that where annual elections end, tyranny begins." DeB 131 -2-If it be true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which become proverbial are generally founded in reason, it is not less true, that when once established, they are often applied to cases to which the reason of them does not extend. DeB 131 -3-I need not look for a proof beyond the case before us. DeB 131 -4-What is the reason on which this proverbial observation is founded? DeB 131 -5-No man will subject himself to the ridicule of pretending that any natural connection subsists between the sun or the seasons, and the period within which human virtue can bear the temptations of power. DeB 131 -6-Happily for mankind, liberty is not, in this respect, confined to any single point of time; but lies within extremes, which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations which may be required by the various situations and circumstances of civil society. DeB 131 -7-The election of magistrates might be, if it were found expedient, as in some instances it actually has been, daily, weekly, or monthly, as well as annual; and if circumstances may require a deviation from the rule on one side, why not also on the other side? DeB 131 -8-Turning our attention to the periods established among ourselves, for the election of the most numerous branches of the State legislatures, we find them by no means coinciding any more in this instance, than in the elections of other civil magistrates. DeB 131 -9-In Connecticut and Rhode Island, the periods are half-yearly. DeB 131 -10-In the other States, South Carolina excepted, they are annual. DeB 131 -11-In South Carolina they are biennial as is proposed in the federal government. DeB 131 -12-Here is a difference, as four to one, between the longest and shortest periods; and yet it would be not easy to show, that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a greater share of rational liberty, than South Carolina; or that either the one or the other of these States is distinguished in these respects, and by these causes, from the States whose elections are different from both.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=53- ParaX=2- XthisXParaX=2-
DeB 131 -1-In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I can discover but one, and that is wholly inapplicable to our case. DeB 131 -2-The important distinction so well understood in America, between a Constitution established by the people and unalterable by the government, and a law established by the government and alterable by the government, seems to have been little understood and less observed in any other country. DeB 131 -3-Wherever the supreme power of legislation has resided, has been supposed to reside also a full power to change the form of the government. DeB 131 -4-Even in Great Britain, where the principles of political and civil liberty have been most discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the Constitution, it is maintained that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent and uncontrollable, as well with regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary objects of legislative provision. DeB 131 -5-They have accordingly, in several instances, actually changed, by legislative acts, some of the most fundamental articles of the government. DeB 131 -6-They have in particular, on several occasions, changed the period of election; and, on the last occasion, not only introduced septennial in place of triennial elections, but by the same act, continued themselves in place four years beyond the term for which they were elected by the people. DeB 131 -7-An attention to these dangerous practices has produced a very natural alarm in the votaries of free government, of which frequency of elections is the corner-stone; and has led them to seek for some security to liberty, against the danger to which it is exposed. DeB 131 -8-Where no Constitution, paramount to the government, either existed or could be obtained, no constitutional security, similar to that established in the United States, was to be attempted. DeB 131 -9-Some other security, therefore, was to be sought for; and what better security would the case admit, than that of selecting and appealing to some simple and familiar portion of time, as a standard for measuring the danger of innovations, for fixing the national sentiment, and for uniting the patriotic exertions? DeB 131 -10-The most simple and familiar portion of time, applicable to the subject was that of a year; and hence the doctrine has been inculcated by a laudable zeal, to erect some barrier against the gradual innovations of an unlimited government, that the advance towards tyranny was to be calculated by the distance of departure from the fixed point of annual elections. DeB 131 -11-But what necessity can there be of applying this expedient to a government limited, as the federal government will be, by the authority of a paramount Constitution? DeB 131 -12-Or who will pretend that the liberties of the people of America will not be more secure under biennial elections, unalterably fixed by such a Constitution, than those of any other nation would be, where elections were annual, or even more frequent, but subject to alterations by the ordinary power of the government?

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=53- ParaX=3- XthisXParaX=3-
DeB 131 -1-The second question stated is, whether biennial elections be necessary or useful. DeB 131 -2-The propriety of answering this question in the affirmative will appear from several very obvious considerations.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=53- ParaX=4- XthisXParaX=4-
DeB 131 -1-No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to legislate. DeB 131 -2-A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of men in private as well as public stations. DeB 131 -3-Another part can only be attained, or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station which requires the use of it. DeB 131 -4-The period of service, ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the extent of practical knowledge requisite to the due performance of the service. DeB 131 -5-The period of legislative service established in most of the States for the more numerous branch is, as we have seen, one year. DeB 131 -6-The question then may be put into this simple form: does the period of two years bear no greater proportion to the knowledge requisite for federal legislation than one year does to the knowledge requisite for State legislation? DeB 131 -6-The very statement of the question, in this form, suggests the answer that ought to be given to it.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=53- ParaX=5- XthisXParaX=5-
DeB 131 -1-In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to the existing laws which are uniform throughout the State, and with which all the citizens are more or less conversant; and to the general affairs of the State, which lie within a small compass, are not very diversified, and occupy much of the attention and conversation of every class of people. DeB 131 -2-The great theatre of the United States presents a very different scene. DeB 131 -3-The laws are so far from being uniform, that they vary in every State; whilst the public affairs of the Union are spread throughout a very extensive region, and are extremely diversified by t e local affairs connected with them, and can with difficulty be correctly learnt in any other place than in the central councils to which a knowledge of them will be brought by the representatives of every part of the empire. DeB 131 -4-Yet some knowledge of the affairs, and even of the laws, of all the States, ought to be possessed by the members from each of the States. DeB 131 -5-How can foreign trade be properly regulated by uniform laws, without some acquaintance with the commerce, the ports, the usages, and the regulatious of the different States? DeB 131 -6-How can the trade between the different States be duly regulated, without some knowledge of their relative situations in these and other respects? DeB 131 -7-How can taxes be judiciously imposed and effectually collected, if they be not accommodated to the different laws and local circumstances relating to these objects in the different States? DeB 131 -8-How can uniform regulations for the militia be duly provided, without a similar knowledge of many internal circumstances by which the States are distinguished from each other? DeB 131 -9-These are the principal objects of federal legislation, and suggest most forcibly the extensive information which the representatives ought to acquire. DeB 131 -10-The other interior objects will require a proportional degree of information with regard to them.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=53- ParaX=6- XthisXParaX=6-
DeB 131 -1-It is true that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be very much diminished. DeB 131 -2-The most laborious task will be the proper inauguration of the government and the primeval formation of a federal code. DeB 131 -3-Improvements on the first draughts will every year become both easier and fewer. DeB 131 -4-Past transactions of the government will be a ready and accurate source of information to new members. DeB 131 -5-The affairs of the Union will become more and more objects of curiosity and conversation among the citizens at large. DeB 131 -6-And the increased intercourse among those of different States will contribute not a little to diffuse a mutual knowledge of their affairs, as this again will contribute to a general assimilation of their manners and laws. DeB 131 -7-But with all these abatements, the business of federal legislation must continue so far to exceed, both in novelty and difficulty, the legislative business of a single State, as to justify the longer period of service assigned to those who are to transact it.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=53- ParaX=7- XthisXParaX=7-
DeB 131 -1-A branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of a federal representative, and which has not been mentioned is that of foreign affairs. DeB 131 -2-In regulating our own commerce he ought to be not only acquainted with the treaties between the United States and other nations, but also with the commercial policy and laws of other nations. DeB 131 -3-He ought not to be altogether ignorant of the law of nations; for that, as far as it is a proper object of municipal legislation, is submitted to the federal government. DeB 131 -4-And although the House of Representatives is not immediately to participate in foreign negotiations and arrangements, yet from the necessary connection between the several branches of public affairs, those particular branches will frequently deserve attention in the ordinary course of legislation, and will sometimes demand particular legislative sanction and co-operation. DeB 131 -5-Some portion of this knowledge may, no doubt, be acquired in a man's closet; but some of it also can only be derived from the public sources of information; and all of it will be acquired to best effect by a practical attention to the subject during the period of actual service in the legislature.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=53- ParaX=8- XthisXParaX=8-
DeB 131 -1-There are other considerations, of less importance, perhaps, but which are not unworthy of notice. DeB 131 -2-The distance which many of the representatives will be obliged to travel, and the arrangements rendered necessary by that circumstance, might be much more serious objections with fit men to this service, if limited to a single year, than if extended to two years. DeB 131 -3-No argument can be drawn on this subject, from the case of the delegates to the existing Congress. DeB 131 -4-They are elected annually, it is true; but their re-election is considered by the legislative assemblies almost as a matter of course. DeB 131 -5-The election of the representatives by the people would not be governed by the same principle.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=53- ParaX=9- XthisXParaX=9-
DeB 131 -1-A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will possess superior talents; will, by frequent reelections, become members of long standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages. DeB 131 -2-The greater the proportion of new members, and the less the information of the bulk of the members the more apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid for them. DeB 131 -3-This remark is no less applicable to the relation which will subsist between the House of Representatives and the Senate.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=53- ParaX=10- XthisXParaX=10-
DeB 131 -1-It is an inconvenience mingled with the advantages of our frequent elections even in single States, where they are large, and hold but one legislative session in a year, that spurious elections cannot be investigated and annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect. DeB 131 -2-If a return can be obtained, no matter by what unlawful means, the irregular member, who takes his seat of course, is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer his purposes. DeB 131 -3-Hence, a very pernicious encouragement is given to the use of unlawful means, for obtaining irregular returns. DeB 131 -4-Were elections for the federal legislature to be annual, this practice might become a very serious abuse, particularly in the more distant States. DeB 131 -5-Each house is, as it necessarily must be, the judge of the elections, qualifications, and returns of its members; and whatever improvements may be suggested by experience, for simplifying and accelerating the process in disputed cases, so great a portion of a year would unavoidably elapse, before an illegitimate member could be dispossessed of his seat, that the prospect of such an event would be little check to unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=53- ParaX=11- XthisXParaX=11-
DeB 131 -1-All these considerations taken together warrant us in affirming, that biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the public as we have seen that they will be safe to the liberty of the people.

Beginning of Federalist Paper No. 53

Close

NO. 54    The Apportionment of Members Among the States
NO. 55    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 56    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 57    The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
NO. 58    Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
NO. 59    Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 60    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 61    The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
NO. 62    The Senate
NO. 63    The Senate Continued
NO. 64    The Powers of the Senate
NO. 65    The Powers of the Senate Continued
NO. 66    Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
NO. 67    The Executive Department
NO. 68    The Mode of Electing the President
NO. 69    The Real Character of the Executive
NO. 70    The Executive Department Further Considered
NO. 71    The Duration in Office of the Executive.
NO. 72    The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
NO. 73    The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
NO. 74    The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
NO. 75    The Treaty Making Power of the Executive
NO. 76    The Appointing Power of the Executive
NO. 77    The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
NO. 78    The Judiciary Department
NO. 79    The Judiciary Department Continued
NO. 80    The Powers of the Judiciary
NO. 81    The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
NO. 82    The Judiciary Continued
NO. 83    The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
NO. 84    Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
NO. 85    Concluding Remarks
NO. 449   
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