Federalist Papers
Sorted By Number    |    Sort By Title     |     Search
NO. 1    General Inroduction
NO. 2    Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 3    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 4    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 5    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence.
NO. 6    Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
NO. 7    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States.
NO. 8    The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
NO. 9    The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 10    The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 11    The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
NO. 12    The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue.
NO. 13    Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government.
NO. 14    Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered.
NO. 15    The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 16    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 17    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 18    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 19    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 20    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 21    Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 22    The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 23    The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
NO. 24    The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 25    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 26    The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 27    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 28    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 29    THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy
NO. 30    Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 31    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 32    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 33    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 34    The Same Subject Continued Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 35    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 36    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 37    Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
NO. 38    The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
NO. 39    The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
NO. 40    The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
NO. 41    General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution
NO. 42    The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 43    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 44    Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
NO. 45    The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
NO. 46    The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
NO. 47    The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
NO. 48    These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
NO. 49    Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
NO. 50    Periodic Appeals to the People Considered
NO. 51    The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
NO. 52    The House of Representatives
NO. 53    The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives
NO. 54    The Apportionment of Members Among the States
NO. 55    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 56    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 57    The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
NO. 58    Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
NO. 59    Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 60    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 61    The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
NO. 62    The Senate
NO. 63    The Senate Continued
NO. 64    The Powers of the Senate
NO. 65    The Powers of the Senate Continued
NO. 66    Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
NO. 67    The Executive Department
NO. 68    The Mode of Electing the President
NO. 69    The Real Character of the Executive
NO. 70    The Executive Department Further Considered
NO. 71    The Duration in Office of the Executive.
NO. 72    The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
NO. 73    The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
NO. 74    The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
NO. 75    The Treaty Making Power of the Executive
NO. 76    The Appointing Power of the Executive
NO. 77    The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
NO. 78    The Judiciary Department
NO. 79    The Judiciary Department Continued
NO. 80    The Powers of the Judiciary
NO. 81    The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
NO. 82    The Judiciary Continued
NO. 83    The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
NO. 84    Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
Close

Read Translated to Modern American English


Read in Original 18th Century American English
side-by-side with
Modern American English Translation


End of Federalist Paper No. 84
FEDERALIST NO. 84
Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
From McLEAN'S Edition, New York.     Wednesday May 28, 1788
Author: Hamilton
To the People of New York


DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=1- XthisXParaX=1-
DeB 131 -1-IN THE course of the foregoing review of the Constitution, I have taken notice of, and endeavored to answer most of the objections which have appeared against it. DeB 131 -2-There, however, remain a few which either did not fall naturally under any particular head or were forgotten in their proper places. DeB 131 -3-These shall now be discussed; but as the subject has been drawn into great length, I shall so far consult brevity as to comprise all my observations on these miscellaneous points in a single paper.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=2- XthisXParaX=2-
DeB 131 -1-The most considerable of the remaining objections is that the plan of the convention contains no bill of rights. DeB 131 -2-Among other answers given to this, it has been upon different occasions remarked that the constitutions of several of the States are in a similar predicament. DeB 131 -3-I add that New York is of the number. DeB 131 -4-And yet the opposers of the new system, in this State, who profess an unlimited admiration for its constitution, are among the most intemperate partisans of a bill of rights. DeB 131 -5-To justify their zeal in this matter, they allege two things: one is that, though the constitution of New York has no bill of rights prefixed to it, yet it contains, in the body of it, various provisions in favor of particular privileges and rights, which, in substance amount to the same thing; the other is, that the Constitution adopts, in their full extent, the common and statute law of Great Britain, by which many other rights, not expressed in it, are equally secured.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=3- XthisXParaX=3-
DeB 131 -1-To the first I answer, that the Constitution proposed by the convention contains, as well as the constitution of this State, a number of such provisions.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=4- XthisXParaX=4-
DeB 131 -1-Independent of those which relate to the structure of the government, we find the following: Article 1, section 3, clause 7 "Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law." DeB 131 -2-Section 9, of the same article, clause 2 "The privilege of the writ of habeas shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. DeB 131 -3-Clause 3 "No bill of attainder or ex-post-facto law shall be passed." DeB 131 -4-Clause 7 "No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States; and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state." DeB 131 -5-Article 3, section 2, clause 3 "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed." DeB 131 -6-Section 3, of the same article "Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort." DeB 131 -7-No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court." DeB 131 -8-And clause 3, of the same section "The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason; but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted." DeB 131 -9-It may well be a question, whether these are not, upon the whole, of equal importance with any which are to be found in the constitution of this State. DeB 131 -10-The establishment of the writ of habeas corpus, the prohibition of ex-post-facto laws, and of TITLES OF NOBILITY, TO WHICH WE HAVE NO CORRESPONDING PROVISION IN OUR CONSTITUTION, are perhaps greater securities to liberty and republicanism than any it contains. DeB 131 -11-The creation of crimes after the commission of the fact, or, in other words, the subjecting of men to punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of no law, and the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny. DeB 131 -12-The observations of the judicious Blackstone, [1] in reference to the latter, are well worthy of recital: "To bereave a man of life, Usays he,e or by violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole nation; but confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and therefore A MORE DANGEROUS ENGINE of arbitrary government." DeB 131 -13-And as a remedy for this fatal evil he is everywhere peculiarly emphatical in his encomiums on the habeas-corpus act, which in one place he calls "the BULWARK of the British Constitution."[2].

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=5- XthisXParaX=5-
DeB 131 -1-Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of the prohibition of titles of nobility. DeB 131 -2-This may truly be denominated the corner-stone of republican government; for so long as they are excluded, there can never be serious danger that the government will be any other than that of the people.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=6- XthisXParaX=6-
DeB 131 -1-To the second that is, to the pretended establishment of the common and state law by the Constitution, I answer, that they are expressly made subject "to such alterations and provisions as the legislature shall from time to time make concerning the same." DeB 131 -2-They are therefore at any moment liable to repeal by the ordinary legislative power, and of course have no constitutional sanction. DeB 131 -3-The only use of the declaration was to recognize the ancient law and to remove doubts which might have been occasioned by the Revolution. DeB 131 -4-This consequently can be considered as no part of a declaration of rights, which under our constitutions must be intended as limitations of the power of the government itself.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=7- XthisXParaX=7-
DeB 131 -1-It has been several times truly remarked that bills of rights are, in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgements of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince. DeB 131 -2-Such was MAGNA CHARTA, obtained by the barons, sword in hand, from King John. DeB 131 -3-Such were the subsequent confirmations of that charter by succeeding princes. DeB 131 -4-Such was the PETITION OF RIGHT assented to by Charles I., in the beginning of his reign. DeB 131 -5-Such, also, was the Declaration of Right presented by the Lords and Commons to the Prince of Orange in 1688, and afterwards thrown into the form of an act of parliament called the Bill of Rights. DeB 131 -6-It is evident, therefore, that, according to their primitive signification, they have no application to constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the people, and executed by their immediate representatives and servants. DeB 131 -7-Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain every thing they have no need of particular reservations. DeB 131 -8-"WE, THE PEOPLE of the United States, to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ORDAIN and ESTABLISH this Constitution for the United States of America." DeB 131 -9-Here is a better recognition of popular rights, than volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal figure in several of our State bills of rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=8- XthisXParaX=8-
DeB 131 -1-But a minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a Constitution like that under consideration, which is merely intended to regulate the general political interests of the nation, than to a constitution which has the regulation of every species of personal and private concerns. DeB 131 -2-If, therefore, the loud clamors against the plan of the convention, on this score, are well founded, no epithets of reprobation will be too strong for the constitution of this State. DeB 131 -3-But the truth is, that both of them contain all which, in relation to their objects, is reasonably to be desired.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=9- XthisXParaX=9-
DeB 131 -1-I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would even be dangerous. DeB 131 -2-They would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. DeB 131 -3-For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? DeB 131 -4-Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? DeB 131 -5-I will not contend that such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense for claiming that power. DeB 131 -6-They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority which was not given, and that the provision against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication, that a power to prescribe proper regulations concerning it was intended to be vested in the national government. DeB 131 -7-This may serve as a specimen of the numerous handles which would be given to the doctrine of constructive powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal for bills of rights.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=10- XthisXParaX=10-
DeB 131 -1-On the subject of the liberty of the press, as much as has been said, I cannot forbear adding a remark or two: in the first place, I observe, that there is not a syllable concerning it in the constitution of this State; in the next, I contend, that whatever has been said about it in that of any other State, amounts to nothing. DeB 131 -2-What signifies a declaration, that "the liberty of the press shall be inviolably preserved"? DeB 131 -3-What is the liberty of the press? DeB 131 -4-Who can give it any definition which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion? DeB 131 -5-I hold it to be impracticable; and from this I infer, that its security, whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the government.[3] DeB 131 -6-And here, after all, as is intimated upon another occasion, must we seek for the only solid basis of all our rights.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=11- XthisXParaX=11-
DeB 131 -1-There remains but one other view of this matter to conclude the point. DeB 131 -2-The truth is, after all the declamations we have heard, that the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS. DeB 131 -3-The several bills of rights in Great Britain form its Constitution, and conversely the constitution of each State is its bill of rights. DeB 131 -4-And the proposed Constitution, if adopted, will be the bill of rights of the Union. DeB 131 -5-Is it one object of a bill of rights to declare and specify the political privileges of the citizens in the structure and administration of the government? DeB 131 -6-This is done in the most ample and precise manner in the plan of the convention; comprehending various precautions for the public security, which are not to be found in any of the State constitutions. DeB 131 -7-Is another object of a bill of rights to define certain immunities and modes of proceeding, which are relative to personal and private concerns? DeB 131 -8-This we have seen has also been attended to, in a variety of cases, in the same plan. DeB 131 -9-Adverting therefore to the substantial meaning of a bill of rights, it is absurd to allege that it is not to be found in the work of the convention. DeB 131 -10-It may be said that it does not go far enough, though it will not be easy to make this appear; but it can with no propriety be contended that there is no such thing. DeB 131 -11-It certainly must be immaterial what mode is observed as to the order of declaring the rights of the citizens, if they are to be found in any part of the instrument which establishes the government. DeB 131 -12-And hence it must be apparent, that much of what has been said on this subject rests merely on verbal and nominal distinctions, entirely foreign from the substance of the thing.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=12- XthisXParaX=12-
DeB 131 -1-Another objection which has been made, and which, from the frequency of its repetition, it is to be presumed is relied on, is of this nature: "It is improper Usay the objectorse to confer such large powers, as are proposed, upon the national government, because the seat of that government must of necessity be too remote from many of the States to admit of a proper knowledge on the part of the constituent, of the conduct of the representative body." DeB 131 -2-This argument, if it proves any thing, proves that there ought to be no general government whatever. DeB 131 -3-For the powers which, it seems to be agreed on all hands, ought to be vested in the Union, cannot be safely intrusted to a body which is not under every requisite control. DeB 131 -4-But there are satisfactory reasons to show that the objection is in reality not well founded. DeB 131 -5-There is in most of the arguments which relate to distance a palpable illusion of the imagination. DeB 131 -6-What are the sources of information by which the people in Montgomery County must regulate their judgment of the conduct of their representatives in the State legislature? DeB 131 -7-Of personal observation they can have no benefit. DeB 131 -8-This is confined to the citizens on the spot. DeB 131 -9-They must therefore depend on the information of intelligent men, in whom they confide; and how must these men obtain their information? DeB 131 -10-Evidently from the complexion of public measures, from the public prints, from correspondences with theirrepresentatives, and with other persons who reside at the place of their deliberations. DeB 131 -11-This does not apply to Montgomery County only, but to all the counties at any considerable distance from the seat of government.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=13- XthisXParaX=13-
DeB 131 -1-It is equally evident that the same sources of information would be open to the people in relation to the conduct of their representatives in the general government, and the impediments to a prompt communication which distance may be supposed to create, will be overbalanced by the effects of the vigilance of the State governments. DeB 131 -2-The executive and legislative bodies of each State will be so many sentinels over the persons employed in every department of the national administration; and as it will be in their power to adopt and pursue a regular and effectual system of intelligence, they can never be at a loss to know the behavior of those who represent their constituents in the national councils, and can readily communicate the same knowledge to the people. DeB 131 -3-Their disposition to apprise the community of whatever may prejudice its interests from another quarter, may be relied upon, if it were only from the rivalship of power. DeB 131 -4-And we may conclude with the fullest assurance that the people, through that channel, will be better informed of the conduct of their national representatives, than they can be by any means they now possess of that of their State representatives.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=14- XthisXParaX=14-
DeB 131 -1-It ought also to be remembered that the citizens who inhabit the country at and near the seat of government will, in all questions that affect the general liberty and prosperity, have the same interest with those who are at a distance, and that they will stand ready to sound the alarm when necessary, and to point out the actors in any pernicious project. DeB 131 -2-The public papers will be expeditious messengers of intelligence to the most remote inhabitants of the Union.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=15- XthisXParaX=15-
DeB 131 -1-Among the many curious objections which have appeared against the proposed Constitution, the most extraordinary and the least colorable is derived from the want of some provision respecting the debts due TO the United States. DeB 131 -2-This has been represented as a tacit relinquishment of those debts, and as a wicked contrivance to screen public defaulters. DeB 131 -3-The newspapers have teemed with the most inflammatory railings on this head; yet there is nothing clearer than that the suggestion is entirely void of foundation, the offspring of extreme ignorance or extreme dishonesty. DeB 131 -4-In addition to the remarks I have made upon the subject in another place, I shall only observe that as it is a plain dictate of common-sense, so it is also an established doctrine of political law, that "STATES NEITHER LOSE ANY OF THEIR RIGHTS, NOR ARE DISCHARGED FROM ANY OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS, BY A CHANGE IN THE FORM OF THEIR CIVIL GOVERNMENT."[4] DeB 131 -5-The last objection of any consequence, which I at present recollect, turns upon the article of expense. DeB 131 -6-If it were even true, that the adoption of the proposed government would occasion a considerable increase of expense, it would be an objection that ought to have no weight against the plan.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=16- XthisXParaX=16-
DeB 131 -1-The great bulk of the citizens of America are with reason convinced, that Union is the basis of their political happiness. DeB 131 -2-Men of sense of all parties now, with few exceptions, agree that it cannot be preserved under the present system, nor without radical alterations; that new and extensive powers ought to be granted to the national head, and that these require a different organization of the federal government a single body being an unsafe depositary of such ample authorities. DeB 131 -3-In conceding all this, the question of expense must be given up; for it is impossible, with any degree of safety, to narrow the foundation upon which the system is to stand. DeB 131 -4-The two branches of the legislature are, in the first instance, to consist of only sixty-five persons, which is the same number of which Congress, under the existing Confederation, may be composed. DeB 131 -5-It is true that this number is intended to be increased; but this is to keep pace with the progress of the population and resources of the country. DeB 131 -6-It is evident that a less number would, even in the first instance, have been unsafe, and that a continuance of the present number would, in a more advanced stage of population, be a very inadequate representation of the people.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=17- XthisXParaX=17-
DeB 131 -1-Whence is the dreaded augmentation of expense to spring? DeB 131 -2-One source indicated, is the multiplication of offices under the new government. DeB 131 -3-Let us examine this a little.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=18- XthisXParaX=18-
DeB 131 -1-It is evident that the principal departments of the administration under the present government, are the same which will be required under the new. DeB 131 -2-There are now a Secretary of War, a Secretary of Foreign Affairs, a Secretary for Domestic Affairs, a Board of Treasury, consisting of three persons, a Treasurer, assistants, clerks, etc. DeB 131 -3-These officers are indispensable under any system, and will suffice under the new as well as the old. DeB 131 -4-As to ambassadors and other ministers and agents in foreign countries, the proposed Constitution can make no other difference than to render their characters, where they reside, more respectable, and their services more useful. DeB 131 -5-As to persons to be employed in the collection of the revenues, it is unquestionably true that these will form a very considerable addition to the number of federal officers; but it will not follow that this will occasion an increase of public expense. DeB 131 -6-It will be in most cases nothing more than an exchange of State for national officers. DeB 131 -7-In the collection of all duties, for instance, the persons employed will be wholly of the latter description. DeB 131 -8-The States individually will stand in no need of any for this purpose. DeB 131 -9-What difference can it make in point of expense to pay officers of the customs appointed by the State or by the United States? DeB 131 -10-There is no good reason to suppose that either the number or the salaries of the latter will be greater than those of the former.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=19- XthisXParaX=19-
DeB 131 -1-Where then are we to seek for those additional articles of expense which are to swell the account to the enormous size that has been represented to us? DeB 131 -2-The chief item which occurs to me respects the support of the judges of the United States. DeB 131 -3-I do not add the President, because there is now a president of Congress, whose expenses may not be far, if any thing, short of those which will be incurred on account of the President of the United States. DeB 131 -4-The support of the judges will clearly be an extra expense, but to what extent will depend on the particular plan which may be adopted in regard to this matter. DeB 131 -5-But upon no reasonable plan can it amount to a sum which will be an object of material consequence.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=20- XthisXParaX=20-
DeB 131 -1-Let us now see what there is to counterbalance any extra expense that may attend the establishment of the proposed government. DeB 131 -2-The first thing which presents itself is that a great part of the business which now keeps Congress sitting through the year will be transacted by the President. DeB 131 -3-Even the management of foreign negotiations will naturally devolve upon him, according to general principles concerted with the Senate, and subject to their final concurrence. DeB 131 -4-Hence it is evident that a portion of the year will suffice for the session of both the Senate and the House of Representatives; we may suppose about a fourth for the latter and a third, or perhaps half, for the former. DeB 131 -5-The extra business of treaties and appointments may give this extra occupation to the Senate. DeB 131 -6-From this circumstance we may infer that, until the House of Representatives shall be increased greatly beyond its present number, there will be a considerable saving of expense from the difference between the constant session of the present and the temporary session of the future Congress.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=21- XthisXParaX=21-
DeB 131 -1-But there is another circumstance of great importance in the view of economy. DeB 131 -2-The business of the United States has hitherto occupied the State legislatures, as well as Congress. DeB 131 -3-The latter has made requisitions which the former have had to provide for. DeB 131 -4-Hence it has happened that the sessions of the State legislatures have been protracted greatly beyond what was necessary for the execution of the mere local business of the States. DeB 131 -5-More than half their time has been frequently employed in matters which related to the United States. DeB 131 -6-Now the members who compose the legislatures of the several States amount to two thousand and upwards, which number has hitherto performed what under the new system will be done in the first instance by sixty-five persons, and probably at no future period by above a fourth or fifth of that number. DeB 131 -7-The Congress under the proposed government will do all the business of the United States themselves, without the intervention of the State legislatures, who thenceforth will have only to attend to the affairs of their particular States, and will not have to sit in any proportion as long as they have heretofore done. DeB 131 -8-This difference in the time of the sessions of the State legislatures will be clear gain, and will alone form an article of saving, which may be regarded as an equivalent for any additional objects of expense that may be occasioned by the adoption of the new system.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=22- XthisXParaX=22-
DeB 131 -1-The result from these observations is that the sources of additional expense from the establishment of the proposed Constitution are much fewer than may have been imagined; that they are counterbalanced by considerable objects of saving; and that while it is questionable on which side the scale will preponderate, it is certain that a government less expensive would be incompetent to the purposes of the Union.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=901- XthisXParaX=901-
DeB 131 -1-1. Vide Blackstone's "Commentaries," vol. 1., p. 136.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=902- XthisXParaX=902-
DeB 131 -1-2. Vide Blackstone's "Commentaries," vol. iv., p. 438.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=84- ParaX=903- XthisXParaX=903-
DeB 131 -1-3. To show that there is a power in the Constitution by which the liberty of the press may be affected, recourse has been had to the power of taxation. DeB 131 -2-It is said that duties may be laid upon the publications so high as to amount to a prohibition. DeB 131 -3-I know not by what logic it could be maintained, that the declarations in the State constitutions, in favor of the freedom of the press, would be a constitutional impediment to the imposition of duties upon publications by the State legislatures. DeB 131 -4-It cannot certainly be pretended that any degree of duties, however low, would be an abridgment of the liberty of the press. DeB 131 -5-We know that newspapers are taxed in Great Britain, and yet it is notorious that the press nowhere enjoys greater liberty than in that country. DeB 131 -6-And if duties of any kind may be laid without a violation of that liberty, it is evident that the extent must depend on legislative discretion, respecting the liberty of the press, will give it no greater security than it will have without them. DeB 131 -7-The same invasions of it may be effected under the State constitutions which contain those declarations through the means of taxation, as under the proposed Constitution, which has nothing of the kind. DeB 131 -8-It would be quite as significant to declare that government ought to be free, that taxes ought not to be excessive, etc., as that the liberty of the press ought not to be restrained.

Beginning of Federalist Paper No. 84

Close

NO. 85    Concluding Remarks
NO. 449   
X