Federalist Papers
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NO. 1    General Inroduction
NO. 2    Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 3    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 4    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 5    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence.
NO. 6    Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
NO. 7    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States.
NO. 8    The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
NO. 9    The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 10    The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 11    The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
NO. 12    The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue.
NO. 13    Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government.
NO. 14    Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered.
NO. 15    The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 16    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 17    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 18    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 19    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 20    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 21    Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 22    The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 23    The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
NO. 24    The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 25    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 26    The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 27    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 28    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 29    THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy
NO. 30    Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 31    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 32    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 33    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 34    The Same Subject Continued Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 35    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 36    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 37    Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
NO. 38    The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
NO. 39    The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
NO. 40    The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
NO. 41    General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution
NO. 42    The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 43    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 44    Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
NO. 45    The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
NO. 46    The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
NO. 47    The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
NO. 48    These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
NO. 49    Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
NO. 50    Periodic Appeals to the People Considered
NO. 51    The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
NO. 52    The House of Representatives
NO. 53    The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives
NO. 54    The Apportionment of Members Among the States
NO. 55    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 56    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 57    The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
NO. 58    Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
NO. 59    Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 60    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 61    The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
NO. 62    The Senate
NO. 63    The Senate Continued
NO. 64    The Powers of the Senate
NO. 65    The Powers of the Senate Continued
NO. 66    Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
NO. 67    The Executive Department
NO. 68    The Mode of Electing the President
NO. 69    The Real Character of the Executive
NO. 70    The Executive Department Further Considered
Close
End of Federalist Paper No. 70
FEDERALIST NO. 70
The Executive Department Further Considered
From the New York Packet     Tuesday March 18, 1788
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of New York


DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=1- XthisXParaX=1-
DeB 131 -1-THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. DeB 131 -2-The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. DeB 131 -3-Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. DeB 131 -4-It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. DeB 131 -5-Every man the least conversant in Roman story, knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=2- XthisXParaX=2-
DeB 131 -1-There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this head. DeB 131 -2-A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. DeB 131 -3-A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=3- XthisXParaX=3-
DeB 131 -1-Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive, it will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? DeB 131 -2-How far can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense? DeB 131 -3-And how far does this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by the convention?

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=4- XthisXParaX=4-
DeB 131 -1-The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support; fourthly, competent powers.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=5- XthisXParaX=5-
DeB 131 -1-The ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense are, first, a due dependence on the people, secondly, a due responsibility.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=6- XthisXParaX=6-
DeB 131 -1-Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justice of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive and a numerous legislature. DeB 131 -2-They have with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand, while they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=7- XthisXParaX=7-
DeB 131 -1-That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. DeB 131 -2-Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=8- XthisXParaX=8-
DeB 131 -1-This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and co-operation of others, in the capacity of counsellors to him. DeB 131 -2-Of the first, the two Consuls of Rome may serve as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in the constitutions of several of the States. DeB 131 -3-New York and New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only States which have intrusted the executive authority wholly to single men.[1] DeB 131 -4-Both these methods of destroying the unity of the Executive have their partisans; but the votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. DeB 131 -5-They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar objections, and may in most lights be examined in conjunction.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=9- XthisXParaX=9-
DeB 131 -1-The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this head. DeB 131 -2-As far, however, as it teaches any thing, it teaches us not to be enamoured of plurality in the Executive. DeB 131 -3-We have seen that the Achaeans, on an experiment of two Praetors, were induced to abolish one. DeB 131 -4-The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the dissensions between the Consuls, and between the military Tribunes, who were at times substituted for the Consuls. DeB 131 -5-But it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to the state from the circumstance of the plurality of those magistrates. DeB 131 -6-That the dissensions between them were not more frequent or more fatal, is a matter of astonishment, until we advert to the singular position in which the republic was almost continually placed, and to the prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the state, and pursued by the Consuls, of making a division of the government between them. DeB 131 -7-The patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle with the plebeians for the preservation of their ancient authorities and dignities; the Consuls, who were generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the personal interest they had in the defense of the privileges of their order. DeB 131 -8-In addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it became an established custom with the Consuls to divide the administration between themselves by lot one of them remaining at Rome to govern the city and its environs, the other taking the command in the more distant provinces. DeB 131 -9-This expedient must, no doubt, have had great influence in preventing those collisions and rivalships which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of the republic.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=10- XthisXParaX=10-
DeB 131 -1-But quitting the dim light of historical research, attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and good sense, we shall discover much greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the Executive, under any modification whatever.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=11- XthisXParaX=11-
DeB 131 -1-Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. DeB 131 -2-If it be a public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. DeB 131 -3-From either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring. DeB 131 -4-Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operation of those whom they divide. DeB 131 -5-If they should unfortunately assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government, in the most critical emergencies of the state. DeB 131 -6-And what is still worse, they might split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the magistracy.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=12- XthisXParaX=12-
DeB 131 -1-Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. DeB 131 -2-But if they have been consulted, and have happened to disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of self-love. DeB 131 -3-They seem to think themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to defeat the success of what has been resolved upon contrary to their sentiments. DeB 131 -4-Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit, and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have credit enough to make their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. DeB 131 -5-Perhaps the question now before the public may, in its consequences, afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable vice, in the human character.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=13- XthisXParaX=13-
DeB 131 -1-Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the Executive. DeB 131 -2-It is here too that they may be most pernicious. DeB 131 -3-In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. DeB 131 -4-The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority. DeB 131 -5-When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. DeB 131 -6-That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. DeB 131 -7-But no favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the executive department. DeB 131 -8-Here, they are pure and unmixed. DeB 131 -9-There is no point at which they cease to operate. DeB 131 -10-They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. DeB 131 -11-They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigor and expedition, and this without any counterbalancing good. DeB 131 -12-In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security, every thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=14- XthisXParaX=14-
DeB 131 -1-It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight to the first case supposed that is, to a plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority a scheme, the advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous sect; but they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable weight to the project of a council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible Executive. DeB 131 -2-An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. DeB 131 -3-If no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=15- XthisXParaX=15-
DeB 131 -1-But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=16- XthisXParaX=16-
DeB 131 -1-Responsibility is of two kinds to censure and to punishment. DeB 131 -2-The first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective office. DeB 131 -3-Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. DeB 131 -4-But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. DeB 131 -5-It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. DeB 131 -6-It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. DeB 131 -7-The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.)

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=17- XthisXParaX=17-
DeB 131 -1-"I was overruled by my council. DeB 131 -2-The council were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point." DeB 131 -3-These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. DeB 131 -4-And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium, of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction? DeB 131 -5-Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task, if there happen to be collusion between the parties concerned, how easy it is to clothe the circumstances with so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those parties?

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=18- XthisXParaX=18-
DeB 131 -1-In the single instance in which the governor of this State is coupled with a council that is, in the appointment to offices, we have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration. DeB 131 -2-Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. DeB 131 -3-Some cases, indeed, have been so flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. DeB 131 -4-When inquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the governor on the members of the council, who, on their part, have charged it upon his nomination; while the people remain altogether at a loss to determine, by whose influence their interests have been committed to hands so unqualified and so manifestly improper. DeB 131 -5-In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=19- XthisXParaX=19-
DeB 131 -1-In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the public peace, that he is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred. DeB 131 -1-It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the Executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first, the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, secondly, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it. DeB 131 -2-Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the nation for the advice they give. DeB 131 -3-Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive department an idea inadmissible in a free government. DeB 131 -4-But even there the king is not bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable for the advice they give. DeB 131 -5-He is the absolute master of his own conduct in the exercise of his office, and may observe or disregard the counsel given to him at his sole discretion.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=20- XthisXParaX=20-
DeB 131 -1-But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office the reason which in the British Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. DeB 131 -2-In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior. DeB 131 -3-In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=21- XthisXParaX=21-
DeB 131 -1-The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained in the State constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. DeB 131 -2-If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. DeB 131 -3-But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. DeB 131 -4-I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be "deep, solid, and ingenious,'' that "the executive power is more easily confined when it is ONE'' [2]; that it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=22- XthisXParaX=22-
DeB 131 -1-A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of security sought for in the multiplication of the Executive, is attainable. DeB 131 -2-Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than of security. DeB 131 -3-The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty, than the credit and influence of either of them separately. DeB 131 -4-When power, therefore, is placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to admit of their interests and views being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who, from the very circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as when he is associated with others. DeB 131 -5-The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number [3], were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. DeB 131 -6-No person would think of proposing an Executive much more numerous than that body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the council. DeB 131 -7-The extreme of these numbers, is not too great for an easy combination; and from such a combination America would have more to fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. DeB 131 -8-A council to a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost always a cloak to his faults.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=23- XthisXParaX=23-
DeB 131 -1-I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be evident that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of government, would form an item in the catalogue of public expenditures too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal utility. DeB 131 -2-I will only add that, prior to the appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the States, who did not admit, as the result of experience, that the UNITY of the executive of this State was one of the best of the distinguishing features of our constitution.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=901- XthisXParaX=901-
DeB 131 -1-1. New York has no council except for the single purpose of appointing to offices; New Jersey has a council whom the governor may consult. DeB 131 -2-But I think, from the terms of the constitution, their resolutions do not bind him.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=70- ParaX=902- XthisXParaX=902-
DeB 131 -1-2. De Lolme.

Beginning of Federalist Paper No. 70

Close

NO. 71    The Duration in Office of the Executive.
NO. 72    The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
NO. 73    The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
NO. 74    The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
NO. 75    The Treaty Making Power of the Executive
NO. 76    The Appointing Power of the Executive
NO. 77    The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
NO. 78    The Judiciary Department
NO. 79    The Judiciary Department Continued
NO. 80    The Powers of the Judiciary
NO. 81    The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
NO. 82    The Judiciary Continued
NO. 83    The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
NO. 84    Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
NO. 85    Concluding Remarks
NO. 449   
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