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NO. 1    General Inroduction
NO. 2    Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 3    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 4    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 5    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence.
NO. 6    Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
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End of Federalist Paper No. 6
FEDERALIST NO. 6
Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
Independent Journal    
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of New York


DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=1- XthisXParaX=1-
DeB 131 -1-THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. DeB 131 -2-I shall now proceed to delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more alarming kind--those which will in all probability flow from dissensions between the States themselves, and from domestic factions and convulsions. DeB 131 -3-These have been already in some instances slightly anticipated; but they deserve a more particular and more full investigation.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=2- XthisXParaX=2-
DeB 131 -1-A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other. DeB 131 -2-To presume a want of motives for such contests as an argument against their existence, would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. DeB 131 -3-To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=3- XthisXParaX=3-
DeB 131 -1-The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. DeB 131 -2-There are some which have a general and almost constant operation upon the collective bodies of society. DeB 131 -3-Of this description are the love of power or the desire of pre-eminence and dominion--the jealousy of power, or the desire of equality and safety. DeB 131 -4-There are others which have a more circumscribed though an equally operative influence within their spheres. DeB 131 -5-Such are the rivalships and competitions of commerce between commercial nations. DeB 131 -6-And there are others, not less numerous than either of the former, which take their origin entirely in private passions; in the attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of leading individuals in the communities of which they are members. DeB 131 -7-Men of this class, whether the favorites of a king or of a people, have in too many instances abused the confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext of some public motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the national tranquillity to personal advantage or personal gratification.

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DeB 131 -1-The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment of a prostitute, [1] at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of his countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the SAMNIANS. DeB 131 -2-The same man, stimulated by private pique against the MEGARENSIANS, [2] another nation of Greece, or to avoid a prosecution with which he was threatened as an accomplice of a supposed theft of the statuary Phidias, [3] or to get rid of the accusations prepared to be brought against him for dissipating the funds of the state in the purchase of popularity, [4] or from a combination of all these causes, was the primitive author of that famous and fatal war, distinguished in the Grecian annals by the name of the PELOPONNESIAN war; which, after various vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the ruin of the Athenian commonwealth.

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DeB 131 -1-The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry VIII., permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown, [5] entertained hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid prize by the influence of the Emperor Charles V. DeB 131 -2-To secure the favor and interest of this enterprising and powerful monarch, he precipitated England into a war with France, contrary to the plainest dictates of policy, and at the hazard of the safety and independence, as well of the kingdom over which he presided by his counsels, as of Europe in general. DeB 131 -3-For if there ever was a sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of universal monarchy, it was the Emperor Charles V., of whose intrigues Wolsey was at once the instrument and the dupe.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=6- XthisXParaX=6-
DeB 131 -1-The influence which the bigotry of one female, [6] the petulance of another, [7] and the cabals of a third, [8] had in the contemporary policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe, are topics that have been too often descanted upon not to be generally known.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=7- XthisXParaX=7-
DeB 131 -1-To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in the production of great national events, either foreign or domestic, according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time. DeB 131 -2-Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from which they are to be drawn, will themselves recollect a variety of instances; and those who have a tolerable knowledge of human nature will not stand in need of such lights to form their opinion either of the reality or extent of that agency. DeB 131 -3-Perhaps, however, a reference, tending to illustrate the general principle, may with propriety be made to a case which has lately happened among ourselves. DeB 131 -4-If Shays had not been a DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would have been plunged into a civil war.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=8- XthisXParaX=8-
DeB 131 -1-But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, in this particular, there are still to be found visionary or designing men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the States, though dismembered and alienated from each other. DeB 131 -2-The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into wars. DeB 131 -3-Commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. DeB 131 -4-They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=9- XthisXParaX=9-
DeB 131 -1-Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true interest of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philosophic spirit? DeB 131 -2-If this be their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? DeB 131 -3-Has it not, on the contrary, invariably been found that momentary passions, and immediate interest, have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility or justice? DeB 131 -4-Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? DeB 131 -5-Are not the former administered by MEN as well as the latter? DeB 131 -6-Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? DeB 131 -7-Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities? DeB 131 -8-Is it not well known that their determinations are often governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and are, of course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those individuals? DeB 131 -9-Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the objects of war? DeB 131 -10-Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? DeB 131 -11-Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has become the prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion? DeB 131 -12-Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for the other? DeB 131 -13-Let experience, the least fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an answer to these inquiries.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=10- XthisXParaX=10-
DeB 131 -1-Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. DeB 131 -2-Yet were they as often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies of the same times. DeB 131 -3-Sparta was little better than a wellregulated camp; and Rome was never sated of carnage and conquest.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=11- XthisXParaX=11-
DeB 131 -1-Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the very war that ended in her destruction. DeB 131 -2-Hannibal had carried her arms into the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and made a conquest of the commonwealth.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=12- XthisXParaX=12-
DeB 131 -1-Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of ambition, till, becoming an object to the other Italian states, Pope Julius II. found means to accomplish that formidable league, [9] which gave a deadly blow to the power and pride of this haughty republic.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=13- XthisXParaX=13-
DeB 131 -1-The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe. DeB 131 -2-They had furious contests with England for the dominion of the sea, and were among the most persevering and most implacable of the opponents of Louis XIV.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=14- XthisXParaX=14-
DeB 131 -1-In the government of Britain the representatives of the people compose one branch of the national legislature. DeB 131 -2-Commerce has been for ages the predominant pursuit of that country. DeB 131 -3-Few nations, nevertheless, have been more frequently engaged in war; and the wars in which that kingdom has been engaged have, in numerous instances, proceeded from the people.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=15- XthisXParaX=15-
DeB 131 -1-There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular as royal wars. DeB 131 -2-The cries of the nation and the importunities of their representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs into war, or continued them in it, contrary to their inclinations, and sometimes contrary to the real interests of the State. DeB 131 -3-In that memorable struggle for superiority between the rival houses of AUSTRIA and BOURBON, which so long kept Europe in a flame, it is well known that the antipathies of the English against the French, seconding the ambition, or rather the avarice, of a favorite leader, [10] protracted the war beyond the limits marked out by sound policy, and for a considerable time in opposition to the views of the court.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=16- XthisXParaX=16-
DeB 131 -1-The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great measure grown out of commercial considerations,--the desire of supplanting and the fear of being supplanted, either in particular branches of traffic or in the general advantages of trade and navigation.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=17- XthisXParaX=17-
DeB 131 -1-From this summary of what has taken place in other countries, whose situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what reason can we have to confide in those reveries which would seduce us into an expectation of peace and cordiality between the members of the present confederacy, in a state of separation? DeB 131 -2-Have we not already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have amused us with promises of an exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses and evils incident to society in every shape? DeB 131 -3-Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our political conduct that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=18- XthisXParaX=18-
DeB 131 -1-Let the point of extreme depression to which our national dignity and credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt everywhere from a lax and ill administration of government, let the revolt of a part of the State of North Carolina, the late menacing disturbances in Pennsylvania, and the actual insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts, declare--!.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=19- XthisXParaX=19-
DeB 131 -1-So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of discord and hostility between the States, in the event of disunion, that it has from long observation of the progress of society become a sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity or nearness of situation, constitutes nations natural enemies. DeB 131 -2-An intelligent writer expresses himself on this subject to this effect: "NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies of each other unless their common weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the differences that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors." DeB 131 -3-This passage, at the same time, points out the EVIL and suggests the REMEDY.[11]

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=901- XthisXParaX=901-
DeB 131 -1-1. Aspasia, vide "Plutarch's Life of Pericles."

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=902- XthisXParaX=902-
DeB 131 -1-2. Ibid

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=903- XthisXParaX=903-
DeB 131 -1-3. Ibid

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=904- XthisXParaX=904-
DeB 131 -1-4. Ibid. Phidias was supposed to have stolen some public gold, with the connivance of Pericles, for the embellishment of the statue of Minerva.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=905- XthisXParaX=905-
DeB 131 -1-5. P Worn by the popes.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=906- XthisXParaX=906-
DeB 131 -1-6. Madame de Maintenon.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=907- XthisXParaX=907-
DeB 131 -1-7. Duchess of Marlborough.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=908- XthisXParaX=908-
DeB 131 -1-8. Madame de Pompadour.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=909- XthisXParaX=909-
DeB 131 -1-9. The League of Cambray, comprehending the Emperor, the King of France, the King of Aragon, and most of the Italian princes and states.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=910- XthisXParaX=910-
DeB 131 -1-10. The Duke of Marlborough.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=6- ParaX=911- XthisXParaX=911-
DeB 131 -1-11. Vide "Principes des Negociations" par 1'Abbe de Mably.

Beginning of Federalist Paper No. 6

Close

NO. 7    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States.
NO. 8    The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
NO. 9    The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 10    The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 11    The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
NO. 12    The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue.
NO. 13    Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government.
NO. 14    Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered.
NO. 15    The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 16    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 17    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 18    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 19    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 20    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 21    Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 22    The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 23    The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
NO. 24    The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 25    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 26    The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 27    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 28    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 29    THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy
NO. 30    Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 31    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 32    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 33    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 34    The Same Subject Continued Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 35    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 36    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 37    Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
NO. 38    The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
NO. 39    The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
NO. 40    The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
NO. 41    General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution
NO. 42    The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 43    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 44    Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
NO. 45    The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
NO. 46    The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
NO. 47    The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
NO. 48    These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
NO. 49    Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
NO. 50    Periodic Appeals to the People Considered
NO. 51    The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
NO. 52    The House of Representatives
NO. 53    The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives
NO. 54    The Apportionment of Members Among the States
NO. 55    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 56    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 57    The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
NO. 58    Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
NO. 59    Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 60    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 61    The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
NO. 62    The Senate
NO. 63    The Senate Continued
NO. 64    The Powers of the Senate
NO. 65    The Powers of the Senate Continued
NO. 66    Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
NO. 67    The Executive Department
NO. 68    The Mode of Electing the President
NO. 69    The Real Character of the Executive
NO. 70    The Executive Department Further Considered
NO. 71    The Duration in Office of the Executive.
NO. 72    The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
NO. 73    The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
NO. 74    The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
NO. 75    The Treaty Making Power of the Executive
NO. 76    The Appointing Power of the Executive
NO. 77    The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
NO. 78    The Judiciary Department
NO. 79    The Judiciary Department Continued
NO. 80    The Powers of the Judiciary
NO. 81    The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
NO. 82    The Judiciary Continued
NO. 83    The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
NO. 84    Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
NO. 85    Concluding Remarks
NO. 449   
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