Federalist Papers
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NO. 1    General Inroduction
NO. 2    Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 3    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 4    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 5    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence.
NO. 6    Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
NO. 7    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States.
NO. 8    The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
NO. 9    The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 10    The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 11    The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
NO. 12    The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue.
NO. 13    Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government.
NO. 14    Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered.
NO. 15    The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 16    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 17    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 18    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 19    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 20    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 21    Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 22    The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 23    The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
NO. 24    The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 25    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 26    The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 27    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 28    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 29    THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy
NO. 30    Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 31    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 32    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 33    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 34    The Same Subject Continued Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 35    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 36    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 37    Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
NO. 38    The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
NO. 39    The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
NO. 40    The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
NO. 41    General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution
NO. 42    The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 43    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 44    Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
NO. 45    The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
NO. 46    The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
NO. 47    The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
NO. 48    These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
NO. 49    Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
NO. 50    Periodic Appeals to the People Considered
NO. 51    The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
NO. 52    The House of Representatives
NO. 53    The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives
NO. 54    The Apportionment of Members Among the States
Close
End of Federalist Paper No. 54
FEDERALIST NO. 54
The Apportionment of Members Among the States
From the New York Packet     Tuesday February 12, 1788
Author: Alexander Hamilton or James Madison
To the People of New York


DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=54- ParaX=1- XthisXParaX=1-
DeB 131 -1-THE next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives relates to the appointment of its members to the several States which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=54- ParaX=2- XthisXParaX=2-
DeB 131 -1-It is not contended that the number of people in each State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to represent the people of each State. DeB 131 -2-The establishment of the same rule for the appointment of taxes, will probably be as little contested; though the rule itself in this case, is by no means founded on the same principle. DeB 131 -3-In the former case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of the people, with which it has a natural and universal connection. DeB 131 -4-In the latter, it has reference to the proportion of wealth, of which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary cases a very unfit one. DeB 131 -5-But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied to the relative wealth and contributions of the States, it is evidently the least objectionable among the practicable rules, and had too recently obtained the general sanction of America, not to have found a ready preference with the convention.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=54- ParaX=3- XthisXParaX=3-
DeB 131 -1-All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said; but does it follow, from an admission of numbers for the measure of representation, or of slaves combined with free citizens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be included in the numerical rule of representation? DeB 131 -2-Slaves are considered as property, not as persons. DeB 131 -3-They ought therefore to be comprehended in estimates of taxation which are founded on property, and to be excluded from representation which is regulated by a census of persons. DeB 131 -4-This is the objection, as I understand it, stated in its full force. DeB 131 -5-I shall be equally candid in stating the reasoning which may be offered on the opposite side.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=54- ParaX=4- XthisXParaX=4-
DeB 131 -1-"We subscribe to the doctrine," might one of our Southern brethren observe, "that representation relates more immediately to persons, and taxation more immediately to property, and we join in the application of this distinction to the case of our slaves. DeB 131 -2-But we must deny the fact, that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as persons. DeB 131 -3-The true state of the case is, that they partake of both these qualities: being considered by our laws, in some respects, as persons, and in other respects as property. DeB 131 -4-In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for a master; in being vendible by one master to another master; and in being subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the capricious will of another, the slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal denomination of property. DeB 131 -5-In being protected, on the other hand, in his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all others, even the master of his labor and his liberty; and in being punishable himself for all violence committed against others, the slave is no less evidently regarded by the law as a member of the society, not as a part of the irrational creation; as a moral person, not as a mere article of property. DeB 131 -6-The federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed character of persons and of property. DeB 131 -7-This is in fact their true character. DeB 131 -8-It is the character bestowed on them by the laws under which they live; and it will not be denied, that these are the proper criterion; because it is only under the pretext that the laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of property, that a place is disputed them in the computation of numbers; and it is admitted, that if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with the other inhabitants.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=54- ParaX=5- XthisXParaX=5-
DeB 131 -1-"This question may be placed in another light. DeB 131 -2-It is agreed on all sides, that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxation, as they are the only proper scale of representation. DeB 131 -3-Would the convention have been impartial or consistent, if they had rejected the slaves from the list of inhabitants, when the shares of representation were to be calculated, and inserted them on the lists when the tariff of contributions was to be adjusted? DeB 131 -4-Could it be reasonably expected, that the Southern States would concur in a system, which considered their slaves in some degree as men, when burdens were to be imposed, but refused to consider them in the same light, when advantages were to be conferred? DeB 131 -5-Might not some surprise also be expressed, that those who reproach the Southern States with the barbarous policy of considering as property a part of their human brethren, should themselves contend, that the government to which all the States are to be parties, ought to consider this unfortunate race more completely in the unnatural light of property, than the very laws of which they complain?

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=54- ParaX=6- XthisXParaX=6-
DeB 131 -1-"It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are not included in the estimate of representatives in any of the States possessing them. DeB 131 -2-They neither vote themselves nor increase the votes of their masters. DeB 131 -3-Upon what principle, then, ought they to be taken into the federal estimate of representation? DeB 131 -4-In rejecting them altogether, the Constitution would, in this respect, have followed the very laws which have been appealed to as the proper guide.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=54- ParaX=7- XthisXParaX=7-
DeB 131 -1-"This objection is repelled by a single observation. DeB 131 -2-It is a fundamental principle of the proposed Constitution, that as the aggregate number of representatives allotted to the several States is to be determined by a federal rule, founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so the right of choosing this allotted number in each State is to be exercised by such part of the inhabitants as the State itself may designate. DeB 131 -3-The qualifications on which the right of suffrage depend are not, perhaps, the same in any two States. DeB 131 -4-In some of the States the difference is very material. DeB 131 -5-In every State, a certain proportion of inhabitants are deprived of this right by the constitution of the State, who will be included in the census by which the federal Constitution apportions the representatives. DeB 131 -6-In this point of view the Southern States might retort the complaint, by insisting that the principle laid down by the convention required that no regard should be had to the policy of particular States towards their own inhabitants; and consequently, that the slaves, as inhabitants, should have been admitted into the census according to their full number, in like manner with other inhabitants, who, by the policy of other States, are not admitted to all the rights of citizens. DeB 131 -7-A rigorous adherence, however, to this principle, is waived by those who would be gainers by it. DeB 131 -8-All that they ask is that equal moderation be shown on the other side. DeB 131 -9-Let the case of the slaves be considered, as it is in truth, a peculiar one. DeB 131 -10-Let the compromising expedient of the Constitution be mutually adopted, which regards them as inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below the equal level of free inhabitants, which regards the SLAVE as divested of two fifths of the MAN.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=54- ParaX=8- XthisXParaX=8-
DeB 131 -1-"After all, may not another ground be taken on which this article of the Constitution will admit of a still more ready defense? DeB 131 -2-We have hitherto proceeded on the idea that representation related to persons only, and not at all to property. DeB 131 -3-But is it a just idea? DeB 131 -4-Government is instituted no less for protection of the property, than of the persons, of individuals. DeB 131 -5-The one as well as the other, therefore, may be considered as represented by those who are charged with the government. DeB 131 -6-Upon this principle it is, that in several of the States, and particularly in the State of New York, one branch of the government is intended more especially to be the guardian of property, and is accordingly elected by that part of the society which is most interested in this object of government. DeB 131 -7-In the federal Constitution, this policy does not prevail. DeB 131 -8-The rights of property are committed into the same hands with the personal rights. DeB 131 -9-Some attention ought, therefore, to be paid to property in the choice of those hands.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=54- ParaX=9- XthisXParaX=9-
DeB 131 -1-"For another reason, the votes allowed in the federal legislature to the people of each State, ought to bear some proportion to the comparative wealth of the States. DeB 131 -2-States have not, like individuals, an influence over each other, arising from superior advantages of fortune. DeB 131 -3-If the law allows an opulent citizen but a single vote in the choice of his representative, the respect and consequence which he derives from his fortunate situation very frequently guide the votes of others to the objects of his choice; and through this imperceptible channel the rights of property are conveyed into the public representation. DeB 131 -4-A State possesses no such influence over other States. DeB 131 -5-It is not probable that the richest State in the Confederacy will ever influence the choice of a single representative in any other State. DeB 131 -6-Nor will the representatives of the larger and richer States possess any other advantage in the federal legislature, over the representatives of other States, than what may result from their superior number alone. DeB 131 -7-As far, therefore, as their superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them to any advantage, it ought to be secured to them by a superior share of representation. DeB 131 -8-The new Constitution is, in this respect, materially different from the existing Confederation, as well as from that of the United Netherlands, and other similar confederacies. DeB 131 -9-In each of the latter, the efficacy of the federal resolutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary resolutions of the states composing the union. DeB 131 -10-Hence the states, though possessing an equal vote in the public councils, have an unequal influence, corresponding with the unequal importance of these subsequent and voluntary resolutions. DeB 131 -11-Under the proposed Constitution, the federal acts will take effect without the necessary intervention of the individual States. DeB 131 -12-They will depend merely on the majority of votes in the federal legislature, and consequently each vote, whether proceeding from a larger or smaller State, or a State more or less wealthy or powerful, will have an equal weight and efficacy: in the same manner as the votes individually given in a State legislature, by the representatives of unequal counties or other districts, have each a precise equality of value and effect; or if there be any difference in the case, it proceeds from the difference in the personal character of the individual representative, rather than from any regard to the extent of the district from which he comes.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=54- ParaX=10- XthisXParaX=10-
DeB 131 -1-"Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the Southern interests might employ on this subject; and although it may appear to be a little strained in some points, yet, on the whole, I must confess that it fully reconciles me to the scale of representation which the convention have established.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=54- ParaX=11- XthisXParaX=11-
DeB 131 -1-In one respect, the establishment of a common measure for representation and taxation will have a very salutary effect. DeB 131 -2-As the accuracy of the census to be obtained by the Congress will necessarily depend, in a considerable degree on the disposition, if not on the co-operation, of the States, it is of great importance that the States should feel as little bias as possible, to swell or to reduce the amount of their numbers. DeB 131 -3-Were their share of representation alone to be governed by this rule, they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants. DeB 131 -4-Were the rule to decide their share of taxation alone, a contrary temptation would prevail. DeB 131 -5-By extending the rule to both objects, the States will have opposite interests, which will control and balance each other, and produce the requisite impartiality.

Beginning of Federalist Paper No. 54

Close

NO. 55    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 56    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 57    The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
NO. 58    Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
NO. 59    Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 60    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 61    The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
NO. 62    The Senate
NO. 63    The Senate Continued
NO. 64    The Powers of the Senate
NO. 65    The Powers of the Senate Continued
NO. 66    Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
NO. 67    The Executive Department
NO. 68    The Mode of Electing the President
NO. 69    The Real Character of the Executive
NO. 70    The Executive Department Further Considered
NO. 71    The Duration in Office of the Executive.
NO. 72    The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
NO. 73    The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
NO. 74    The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
NO. 75    The Treaty Making Power of the Executive
NO. 76    The Appointing Power of the Executive
NO. 77    The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
NO. 78    The Judiciary Department
NO. 79    The Judiciary Department Continued
NO. 80    The Powers of the Judiciary
NO. 81    The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
NO. 82    The Judiciary Continued
NO. 83    The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
NO. 84    Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
NO. 85    Concluding Remarks
NO. 449   
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