Federalist Papers
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NO. 1    General Inroduction
NO. 2    Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 3    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 4    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 5    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence.
NO. 6    Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
NO. 7    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States.
NO. 8    The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
NO. 9    The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 10    The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 11    The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
NO. 12    The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue.
NO. 13    Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government.
NO. 14    Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered.
NO. 15    The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 16    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 17    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 18    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 19    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 20    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 21    Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 22    The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 23    The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
NO. 24    The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 25    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 26    The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 27    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 28    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 29    THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy
NO. 30    Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 31    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 32    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 33    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 34    The Same Subject Continued Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 35    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 36    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
Close
End of Federalist Paper No. 36
FEDERALIST NO. 36
The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
From the New York Packet     Tuesday January 8, 1788
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of New York


DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=36- ParaX=1- XthisXParaX=1-
DeB 131 -1-WE HAVE seen that the result of the observations, to which the foregoing number has been principally devoted, is, that from the natural operation of the different interests and views of the various classes of the community, whether the representation of the people be more or less numerous, it will consist almost entirely of proprietors of land, of merchants, and of members of the learned professions, who will truly represent all those different interests and views. DeB 131 -2-If it should be objected that we have seen other descriptions of men in the local legislatures, I answer that it is admitted there are exceptions to the rule, but not in sufficient number to influence the general complexion or character of the government. DeB 131 -3-There are strong minds in every walk of life that will rise superior to the disadvantages of situation, and will command the tribute due to their merit, not only from the classes to which they particularly belong, but from the society in general. DeB 131 -4-The door ought to be equally open to all; and I trust, for the credit of human nature, that we shall see examples of such vigorous plants flourishing in the soil of federal as well as of State legislation; but occasional instances of this sort will not render the reasoning founded upon the general course of things, less conclusive.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=36- ParaX=2- XthisXParaX=2-
DeB 131 -1-The subject might be placed in several other lights that would all lead to the same result; and in particular it might be asked, What greater affinity or relation of interest can be conceived between the carpenter and blacksmith, and the linen manufacturer or stocking weaver, than between the merchant and either of them? DeB 131 -2-It is notorious that there are often as great rivalships between different branches of the mechanic or manufacturing arts as there are between any of the departments of labor and industry; so that, unless the representative body were to be far more numerous than would be consistent with any idea of regularity or wisdom in its deliberations, it is impossible that what seems to be the spirit of the objection we have been considering should ever be realized in practice. DeB 131 -3-But I forbear to dwell any longer on a matter which has hitherto worn too loose a garb to admit even of an accurate inspection of its real shape or tendency.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=36- ParaX=3- XthisXParaX=3-
DeB 131 -1-There is another objection of a somewhat more precise nature that claims our attention. DeB 131 -2-It has been asserted that a power of internal taxation in the national legislature could never be exercised with advantage, as well from the want of a sufficient knowledge of local circumstances, as from an interference between the revenue laws of the Union and of the particular States. DeB 131 -3-The supposition of a want of proper knowledge seems to be entirely destitute of foundation. DeB 131 -4-If any question is depending in a State legislature respecting one of the counties, which demands a knowledge of local details, how is it acquired? DeB 131 -5-No doubt from the information of the members of the county. DeB 131 -6-Cannot the like knowledge be obtained in the national legislature from the representatives of each State? DeB 131 -7-And is it not to be presumed that the men who will generally be sent there will be possessed of the necessary degree of intelligence to be able to communicate that information? DeB 131 -8-Is the knowledge of local circumstances, as applied to taxation, a minute topographical acquaintance with all the mountains, rivers, streams, highways, and bypaths in each State; or is it a general acquaintance with its situation and resources, with the state of its agriculture, commerce, manufactures, with the nature of its products and consumptions, with the different degrees and kinds of its wealth, property, and industry?

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=36- ParaX=4- XthisXParaX=4-
DeB 131 -1-Nations in general, even under governments of the more popular kind, usually commit the administration of their finances to single men or to boards composed of a few individuals, who digest and prepare, in the first instance, the plans of taxation, which are afterwards passed into laws by the authority of the sovereign or legislature.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=36- ParaX=5- XthisXParaX=5-
DeB 131 -1-Inquisitive and enlightened statesmen are deemed everywhere best qualified to make a judicious selection of the objects proper for revenue; which is a clear indication, as far as the sense of mankind can have weight in the question, of the species of knowledge of local circumstances requisite to the purposes of taxation.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=36- ParaX=6- XthisXParaX=6-
DeB 131 -1-The taxes intended to be comprised under the general denomination of internal taxes may be subdivided into those of the DIRECT and those of the INDIRECT kind. DeB 131 -2-Though the objection be made to both, yet the reasoning upon it seems to be confined to the former branch. DeB 131 -3-And indeed, as to the latter, by which must be understood duties and excises on articles of consumption, one is at a loss to conceive what can be the nature of the difficulties apprehended. DeB 131 -4-The knowledge relating to them must evidently be of a kind that will either be suggested by the nature of the article itself, or can easily be procured from any well-informed man, especially of the mercantile class. DeB 131 -5-The circumstances that may distinguish its situation in one State from its situation in another must be few, simple, and easy to be comprehended. DeB 131 -6-The principal thing to be attended to, would be to avoid those articles which had been previously appropriated to the use of a particular State; and there could be no difficulty in ascertaining the revenue system of each. DeB 131 -7-This could always be known from the respective codes of laws, as well as from the information of the members from the several States.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=36- ParaX=7- XthisXParaX=7-
DeB 131 -1-The objection, when applied to real property or to houses and lands, appears to have, at first sight, more foundation, but even in this view it will not bear a close examination. DeB 131 -2-Land taxes are co monly laid in one of two modes, either by ACTUAL valuations, permanent or periodical, or by OCCASIONAL assessments, at the discretion, or according to the best judgment, of certain officers whose duty it is to make them. DeB 131 -3-In either case, the EXECUTION of the business, which alone requires the knowledge of local details, must be devolved upon discreet persons in the character of commissioners or assessors, elected by the people or appointed by the government for the purpose. DeB 131 -4-All that the law can do must be to name the persons or to prescribe the manner of their election or appointment, to fix their numbers and qualifications and to draw the general outlines of their powers and duties. DeB 131 -5-And what is there in all this that cannot as well be performed by the national legislature as by a State legislature? DeB 131 -6-The attention of either can only reach to general principles; local details, as already observed, must be referred to those who are to execute the plan.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=36- ParaX=8- XthisXParaX=8-
DeB 131 -1-But there is a simple point of view in which this matter may be placed that must be altogether satisfactory. DeB 131 -2-The national legislature can make use of the SYSTEM OF EACH STATE WITHIN THAT STATE. DeB 131 -3-The method of laying and collecting this species of taxes in each State can, in all its parts, be adopted and employed by the federal government.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=36- ParaX=9- XthisXParaX=9-
DeB 131 -1-Let it be recollected that the proportion of these taxes is not to be left to the discretion of the national legislature, but is to be determined by the numbers of each State, as described in the second section of the first article. DeB 131 -2-An actual census or enumeration of the people must furnish the rule, a circumstance which effectually shuts the door to partiality or oppression. DeB 131 -3-The abuse of this power of taxation seems to have been provided against with guarded circumspection. DeB 131 -4-In addition to the precaution just mentioned, there is a provision that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be UNIFORM throughout the United States."

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=36- ParaX=10- XthisXParaX=10-
DeB 131 -1-It has been very properly observed by different speakers and writers on the side of the Constitution, that if the exercise of the power of internal taxation by the Union should be discovered on experiment to be really inconvenient, the federal government may then forbear the use of it, and have recourse to requisitions in its stead. DeB 131 -2-By way of answer to this, it has been triumphantly asked, Why not in the first instance omit that ambiguous power, and rely upon the latter resource? DeB 131 -3-Two solid answers may be given. DeB 131 -4-The first is, that the exercise of that power, if convenient, will be preferable, because it will be more effectual; and it is impossible to prove in theory, or otherwise than by the experiment, that it cannot be advantageously exercised. DeB 131 -5-The contrary, indeed, appears most probable. DeB 131 -6-The second answer is, that the existence of such a power in the Constitution will have a strong influence in giving efficacy to requisitions. DeB 131 -7-When the States know that the Union can apply itself without their agency, it will be a powerful motive for exertion on their part.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=36- ParaX=11- XthisXParaX=11-
DeB 131 -1-As to the interference of the revenue laws of the Union, and of its members, we have already seen that there can be no clashing or repugnancy of authority. DeB 131 -2-The laws cannot, therefore, in a legal sense, interfere with each other; and it is far from impossible to avoid an interference even in the policy of their different systems. DeB 131 -3-An effectual expedient for this purpose will be, mutually, to abstain from those objects which either side may have first had recourse to. DeB 131 -4-As neither can CONTROL the other, each will have an obvious and sensible interest in this reciprocal forbearance. DeB 131 -5-And where there is an IMMEDIATE common interest, we may safely count upon its operation. DeB 131 -6-When the particular debts of the States are done away, and their expenses come to be limited within their natural compass, the possibility almost of interference will vanish. DeB 131 -7-A small land tax will answer the purpose of the States, and will be their most simple and most fit resource.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=36- ParaX=12- XthisXParaX=12-
DeB 131 -1-Many spectres have been raised out of this power of internal taxation, to excite the apprehensions of the people: double sets of revenue officers, a duplication of their burdens by double taxations, and the frightful forms of odious and oppressive poll-taxes, have been played off with all the ingenious dexterity of political legerdemain.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=36- ParaX=13- XthisXParaX=13-
DeB 131 -1-As to the first point, there are two cases in which there can be no room for double sets of officers: one, where the right of imposing the tax is exclusively vested in the Union, which applies to the duties on imports; the other, where the object has not fallen under any State regulation or provision, which may be applicable to a variety of objects. DeB 131 -2-In other cases, the probability is that the United States will either wholly abstain from the objects preoccupied for local purposes, or will make use of the State officers and State regulations for collecting the additional imposition. DeB 131 -3-This will best answer the views of revenue, because it will save expense in the collection, and will best avoid any occasion of disgust to the State governments and to the people. DeB 131 -4-At all events, here is a practicable expedient for avoiding such an inconvenience; and nothing more can be required than to show that evils predicted to not necessarily result from the plan.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=36- ParaX=14- XthisXParaX=14-
DeB 131 -1-As to any argument derived from a supposed system of influence, it is a sufficient answer to say that it ought not to be presumed; but the supposition is susceptible of a more precise answer. DeB 131 -2-If such a spirit should infest the councils of the Union, the most certain road to the accomplishment of its aim would be to employ the State officers as much as possible, and to attach them to the Union by an accumulation of their emoluments. DeB 131 -3-This would serve to turn the tide of State influence into the channels of the national government, instead of making federal influence flow in an opposite and adverse current. DeB 131 -4-But all suppositions of this kind are invidious, and ought to be banished from the consideration of the great question before the people. DeB 131 -5-They can answer no other end than to cast a mist over the truth.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=36- ParaX=15- XthisXParaX=15-
DeB 131 -1-As to the suggestion of double taxation, the answer is plain. DeB 131 -2-The wants of the Union are to be supplied in one way or another; if to be done by the authority of the federal government, it will not be to be done by that of the State government. DeB 131 -3-The quantity of taxes to be paid by the community must be the same in either case; with this advantage, if the provision is to be made by the Union that the capital resource of commercial imposts, which is the most convenient branch of revenue, can be prudently improved to a much greater extent under federal than under State regulation, and of course will render it less necessary to recur to more inconvenient methods; and with this further advantage, that as far as there may be any real difficulty in the exercise of the power of internal taxation, it will impose a disposition to greater care in the choice and arrangement of the means; and must naturally tend to make it a fixed point of policy in the national administration to go as far as may be practicable in making the luxury of the rich tributary to the public treasury, in order to diminish the necessity of those impositions which might create dissatisfaction in the poorer and most numerous classes of the society. DeB 131 -4-Happy it is when the interest which the government has in the preservation of its own power, coincides with a proper distribution of the public burdens, and tends to guard the least wealthy part of the community from oppression!.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=36- ParaX=16- XthisXParaX=16-
DeB 131 -1-As to poll taxes, I, without scruple, confess my disapprobation of them; and though they have prevailed from an early period in those States [1] which have uniformly been the most tenacious of their rights, I should lament to see them introduced into practice under the national government. DeB 131 -2-But does it follow because there is a power to lay them that they will actually be laid? DeB 131 -3-Every State in the Union has power to impose taxes of this kind; and yet in several of them they are unknown in practice. DeB 131 -4-Are the State governments to be stigmatized as tyrannies, because they possess this power? DeB 131 -5-If they are not, with what propriety can the like power justify such a charge against the national government, or even be urged as an obstacle to its adoption? DeB 131 -6-As little friendly as I am to the species of imposition, I still feel a thorough conviction that the power of having recourse to it ought to exist in the federal government. DeB 131 -7-There are certain emergencies of nations, in which expedients, that in the ordinary state of things ought to be forborne, become essential to the public weal. DeB 131 -8-And the government, from the possibility of such emergencies, ought ever to have the option of making use of them. DeB 131 -9-The real scarcity of objects in this country, which may be considered as productive sources of revenue, is a reason peculiar to itself, for not abridging the discretion of the national councils in this respect. DeB 131 -10-There may exist certain critical and tempestuous conjunctures of the State, in which a poll tax may become an inestimable resource. DeB 131 -11-And as I know nothing to exempt this portion of the globe from the common calamities that have befallen other parts of it, I acknowledge my aversion to every project that is calculated to disarm the government of a single weapon, which in any possible contingency might be usefully employed for the general defense and security.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=36- ParaX=17- XthisXParaX=17-
DeB 131 -1-I have now gone through the examination of such of the powers proposed to be vested in the United States, which may be considered as having an immediate relation to the energy of the government; and have endeavored to answer the principal objections which have been made to them. DeB 131 -2-I have passed over in silence those minor authorities, which are either too inconsiderable to have been thought worthy of the hostilities of the opponents of the Constitution, or of too manifest propriety to admit of controversy. DeB 131 -3-The mass of judiciary power, however, might have claimed an investigation under this head, had it not been for the consideration that its organization and its extent may be more advantageously considered in connection. DeB 131 -4-This has determined me to refer it to the branch of our inquiries upon which we shall next enter.

Beginning of Federalist Paper No. 36

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NO. 37    Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
NO. 38    The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
NO. 39    The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
NO. 40    The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
NO. 41    General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution
NO. 42    The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 43    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 44    Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
NO. 45    The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
NO. 46    The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
NO. 47    The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
NO. 48    These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
NO. 49    Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
NO. 50    Periodic Appeals to the People Considered
NO. 51    The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
NO. 52    The House of Representatives
NO. 53    The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives
NO. 54    The Apportionment of Members Among the States
NO. 55    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 56    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 57    The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
NO. 58    Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
NO. 59    Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 60    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 61    The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
NO. 62    The Senate
NO. 63    The Senate Continued
NO. 64    The Powers of the Senate
NO. 65    The Powers of the Senate Continued
NO. 66    Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
NO. 67    The Executive Department
NO. 68    The Mode of Electing the President
NO. 69    The Real Character of the Executive
NO. 70    The Executive Department Further Considered
NO. 71    The Duration in Office of the Executive.
NO. 72    The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
NO. 73    The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
NO. 74    The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
NO. 75    The Treaty Making Power of the Executive
NO. 76    The Appointing Power of the Executive
NO. 77    The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
NO. 78    The Judiciary Department
NO. 79    The Judiciary Department Continued
NO. 80    The Powers of the Judiciary
NO. 81    The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
NO. 82    The Judiciary Continued
NO. 83    The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
NO. 84    Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
NO. 85    Concluding Remarks
NO. 449   
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