Federalist Papers
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NO. 1    General Inroduction
NO. 2    Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 3    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 4    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 5    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence.
NO. 6    Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
NO. 7    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States.
NO. 8    The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
NO. 9    The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 10    The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 11    The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
NO. 12    The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue.
NO. 13    Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government.
NO. 14    Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered.
NO. 15    The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 16    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 17    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 18    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 19    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 20    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
Close
End of Federalist Paper No. 20
FEDERALIST NO. 20
The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
From the New York Packet     Tuesday December 11, 1787
Author: Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
To the People of New York


DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=1- XthisXParaX=1-
DeB 131 -1-THE United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather of aristocracies of a very remarkable texture, yet confirming all the lessons derived from those which we have already reviewed.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=2- XthisXParaX=2-
DeB 131 -1-The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign states, and each state or province is a composition of equal and independent cities. DeB 131 -2-In all important cases, not only the provinces but the cities must be unanimous.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=3- XthisXParaX=3-
DeB 131 -1-The sovereignty of the Union is represented by the States-General, consisting usually of about fifty deputies appointed by the provinces. DeB 131 -2-They hold their seats, some for life, some for six, three, and one years; from two provinces they continue in appointment during pleasure.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=4- XthisXParaX=4-
DeB 131 -1-The States-General have authority to enter into treaties and alliances; to make war and peace; to raise armies and equip fleets; to ascertain quotas and demand contributions. DeB 131 -2-In all these cases, however, unanimity and the sanction of their constituents are requisite. DeB 131 -3-They have authority to appoint and receive ambassadors; to execute treaties and alliances already formed; to provide for the collection of duties on imports and exports; to regulate the mint, with a saving to the provincial rights; to govern as sovereigns the dependent territories. DeB 131 -4-The provinces are restrained, unless with the general consent, from entering into foreign treaties; from establishing imposts injurious to others, or charging their neighbors with higher duties than their own subjects. DeB 131 -5-A council of state, a chamber of accounts, with five colleges of admiralty, aid and fortify the federal administration.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=5- XthisXParaX=5-
DeB 131 -1-The executive magistrate of the union is the stadtholder, who is now an hereditary prince. DeB 131 -2-His principal weight and influence in the republic are derived from this independent title; from his great patrimonial estates; from his family connections with some of the chief potentates of Europe; and, more than all, perhaps, from his being stadtholder in the several provinces, as well as for the union; in which provincial quality he has the appointment of town magistrates under certain regulations, executes provincial decrees, presides when he pleases in the provincial tribunals, and has throughout the power of pardon.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=6- XthisXParaX=6-
DeB 131 -1-As stadtholder of the union, he has, however, considerable prerogatives.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=7- XthisXParaX=7-
DeB 131 -1-In his political capacity he has authority to settle disputes between the provinces, when other methods fail; to assist at the deliberations of the States-General, and at their particular conferences; to give audiences to foreign ambassadors, and to keep agents for his particular affairs at foreign courts.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=8- XthisXParaX=8-
DeB 131 -1-In his military capacity he commands the federal troops, provides for garrisons, and in general regulates military affairs; disposes of all appointments, from colonels to ensigns, and of the governments and posts of fortified towns.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=9- XthisXParaX=9-
DeB 131 -1-In his marine capacity he is admiral-general, and superintends and directs every thing relative to naval forces and other naval affairs; presides in the admiralties in person or by proxy; appoints lieutenant-admirals and other officers; and establishes councils of war, whose sentences are not executed till he approves them.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=10- XthisXParaX=10-
DeB 131 -1-His revenue, exclusive of his private income, amounts to three hundred thousand florins. DeB 131 -2-The standing army which he commands consists of about forty thousand men.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=11- XthisXParaX=11-
DeB 131 -1-Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic confederacy, as delineated on parchment. DeB 131 -2-What are the characters which practice has stamped upon it? DeB 131 -3-Imbecility in the government; discord among the provinces; foreign influence and indignities; a precarious existence in peace, and peculiar calamities from war.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=12- XthisXParaX=12-
DeB 131 -1-It was long ago remarked by Grotius, that nothing but the hatred of his countrymen to the house of Austria kept them from being ruined by the vices of their constitution.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=13- XthisXParaX=13-
DeB 131 -1-The union of Utrecht, says another respectable writer, reposes an authority in the States-General, seemingly sufficient to secure harmony, but the jealousy in each province renders the practice very different from the theory.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=14- XthisXParaX=14-
DeB 131 -1-The same instrument, says another, obliges each province to levy certain contributions; but this article never could, and probably never will, be executed; because the inland provinces, who have little commerce, cannot pay an equal quota.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=15- XthisXParaX=15-
DeB 131 -1-In matters of contribution, it is the practice to waive the articles of the constitution. DeB 131 -2-The danger of delay obliges the consenting provinces to furnish their quotas, without waiting for the others; and then to obtain reimbursement from the others, by deputations, which are frequent, or otherwise, as they can. DeB 131 -3-The great wealth and influence of the province of Holland enable her to effect both these purposes.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=16- XthisXParaX=16-
DeB 131 -1-It has more than once happened, that the deficiencies had to be ultimately collected at the point of the bayonet; a thing practicable, though dreadful, in a confedracy where one of the members exceeds in force all the rest, and where several of them are too small to meditate resistance; but utterly impracticable in one composed of members, several of which are equal to each other in strength and resources, and equal singly to a vigorous and persevering defense.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=17- XthisXParaX=17-
DeB 131 -1-Foreign ministers, says Sir William Temple, who was himself a foreign minister, elude matters taken ad referendum, by tampering with the provinces and cities. DeB 131 -2-In 1726, the treaty of Hanover was delayed by these means a whole year. DeB 131 -3-Instances of a like nature are numerous and notorious.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=18- XthisXParaX=18-
DeB 131 -1-In critical emergencies, the States-General are often compelled to overleap their constitutional bounds. DeB 131 -2-In 1688, they concluded a treaty of themselves at the risk of their heads. DeB 131 -3-The treaty of Westphalia, in 1648, by which their independence was formerly and finally recognized, was concluded without the consent of Zealand. DeB 131 -4-Even as recently as the last treaty of peace with Great Britain, the constitutional principle of unanimity was departed from. DeB 131 -5-A weak constitution must necessarily terminate in dissolution, for want of proper powers, or the usurpation of powers requisite for the public safety. DeB 131 -6-Whether the usurpation, when once begun, will stop at the salutary point, or go forward to the dangerous extreme, must depend on the contingencies of the moment. DeB 131 -7-Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the assumptions of power, called for, on pressing exigencies, by a defective constitution, than out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional authorities.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=19- XthisXParaX=19-
DeB 131 -1-Notwithstanding the calamities produced by the stadtholdership, it has been supposed that without his influence in the individual provinces, the causes of anarchy manifest in the confederacy would long ago have dissolved it. DeB 131 -2-"Under such a government," says the Abbe Mably, "the Union could never have subsisted, if the provinces had not a spring within themselves, capable of quickening their tardiness, and compelling them to the same way of thinking. DeB 131 -3-This spring is the stadtholder." DeB 131 -4-It is remarked by Sir William Temple, "that in the intermissions of the stadtholdership, Holland, by her riches and her authority, which drew the others into a sort of dependence, supplied the place."

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=20- XthisXParaX=20-
DeB 131 -1-These are not the only circumstances which have controlled the tendency to anarchy and dissolution. DeB 131 -2-The surrounding powers impose an absolute necessity of union to a certain degree, at the same time that they nourish by their intrigues the constitutional vices which keep the republic in some degree always at their mercy.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=21- XthisXParaX=21-
DeB 131 -1-The true patriots have long bewailed the fatal tendency of these vices, and have made no less than four regular experiments by EXTRAORDINARY ASSEMBLIES, convened for the special purpose, to apply a remedy. DeB 131 -2-As many times has their laudable zeal found it impossible to UNITE THE PUBLIC COUNCILS in reforming the known, the acknowledged, the fatal evils of the existing constitution. DeB 131 -3-Let us pause, my fellow-citizens, for one moment, over this melancholy and monitory lesson of history; and with the tear that drops for the calamities brought on mankind by their adverse opinions and selfish passions, let our gratitude mingle an ejaculation to Heaven, for the propitious concord which has distinguished the consultations for our political happiness.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=22- XthisXParaX=22-
DeB 131 -1-A design was also conceived of establishing a general tax to be administered by the federal authority. DeB 131 -2-This also had its adversaries and failed.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=23- XthisXParaX=23-
DeB 131 -1-This unhappy people seem to be now suffering from popular convulsions, from dissensions among the states, and from the actual invasion of foreign arms, the crisis of their distiny. DeB 131 -2-All nations have their eyes fixed on the awful spectacle. DeB 131 -3-The first wish prompted by humanity is, that this severe trial may issue in such a revolution of their government as will establish their union, and render it the parent of tranquillity, freedom and happiness: The next, that the asylum under which, we trust, the enjoyment of these blessings will speedily be secured in this country, may receive and console them for the catastrophe of their own.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=20- ParaX=24- XthisXParaX=24-
DeB 131 -1-I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contemplation of these federal precedents. DeB 131 -2-Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. DeB 131 -3-The important truth, which it unequivocally pronounces in the present case, is that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity, by substituting VIOLENCE in place of LAW, or the destructive COERCION of the SWORD in place of the mild and salutary COERCION of the MAGISTRACY.

Beginning of Federalist Paper No. 20

Close

NO. 21    Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 22    The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 23    The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
NO. 24    The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 25    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 26    The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 27    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 28    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 29    THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy
NO. 30    Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 31    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 32    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 33    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 34    The Same Subject Continued Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 35    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 36    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 37    Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
NO. 38    The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
NO. 39    The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
NO. 40    The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
NO. 41    General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution
NO. 42    The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 43    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 44    Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
NO. 45    The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
NO. 46    The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
NO. 47    The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
NO. 48    These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
NO. 49    Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
NO. 50    Periodic Appeals to the People Considered
NO. 51    The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
NO. 52    The House of Representatives
NO. 53    The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives
NO. 54    The Apportionment of Members Among the States
NO. 55    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 56    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 57    The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
NO. 58    Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
NO. 59    Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 60    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 61    The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
NO. 62    The Senate
NO. 63    The Senate Continued
NO. 64    The Powers of the Senate
NO. 65    The Powers of the Senate Continued
NO. 66    Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
NO. 67    The Executive Department
NO. 68    The Mode of Electing the President
NO. 69    The Real Character of the Executive
NO. 70    The Executive Department Further Considered
NO. 71    The Duration in Office of the Executive.
NO. 72    The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
NO. 73    The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
NO. 74    The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
NO. 75    The Treaty Making Power of the Executive
NO. 76    The Appointing Power of the Executive
NO. 77    The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
NO. 78    The Judiciary Department
NO. 79    The Judiciary Department Continued
NO. 80    The Powers of the Judiciary
NO. 81    The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
NO. 82    The Judiciary Continued
NO. 83    The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
NO. 84    Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
NO. 85    Concluding Remarks
NO. 449   
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