Federalist Papers
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NO. 1    General Inroduction
NO. 2    Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 3    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 4    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 5    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence.
NO. 6    Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
NO. 7    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States.
NO. 8    The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
NO. 9    The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 10    The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 11    The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
NO. 12    The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue.
NO. 13    Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government.
NO. 14    Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered.
NO. 15    The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 16    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 17    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 18    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 19    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
Close
End of Federalist Paper No. 19
FEDERALIST NO. 19
The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
For the Independent Journal     Saturday December 8, 1787
Author: Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
To the People of New York


DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=19- ParaX=1- XthisXParaX=1-
DeB 131 -1-THE examples of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper, have not exhausted the source of experimental instruction on this subject. DeB 131 -2-There are existing institutions, founded on a similar principle, which merit particular consideration. DeB 131 -3-The first which presents itself is the Germanic body.

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DeB 131 -1-In the early ages of Christianity, Germany was occupied by seven distinct nations, who had no common chief. DeB 131 -2-The Franks, one of the number, having conquered the Gauls, established the kingdom which has taken its name from them. DeB 131 -3-In the ninth century Charlemagne, its warlike monarch, carried his victorious arms in every direction; and Germany became a part of his vast dominions. DeB 131 -4-On the dismemberment, which took place under his sons, this part was erected into a separate and independent empire. DeB 131 -5-Charlemagne and his immediate descendants possessed the reality, as well as the ensigns and dignity of imperial power. DeB 131 -6-But the principal vassals, whose fiefs had become hereditary, and who composed the national diets which Charlemagne had not abolished, gradually threw off the yoke and advanced to sovereign jurisdiction and independence. DeB 131 -7-The force of imperial sovereignty was insufficient to restrain such powerful dependants; or to preserve the unity and tranquillity of the empire. DeB 131 -8-The most furious private wars, accompanied with every species of calamity, were carried on between the different princes and states. DeB 131 -9-The imperial authority, unable to maintain the public order, declined by degrees till it was almost extinct in the anarchy, which agitated the long interval between the death of the last emperor of the Suabian, and the accession of the first emperor of the Austrian lines. DeB 131 -10-In the eleventh century the emperors enjoyed full sovereignty: In the fifteenth they had little more than the symbols and decorations of power.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=19- ParaX=3- XthisXParaX=3-
DeB 131 -1-Out of this feudal system, which has itself many of the important features of a confederacy, has grown the federal system which constitutes the Germanic empire. DeB 131 -2-Its powers are vested in a diet representing the component members of the confederacy; in the emperor, who is the executive magistrate, with a negative on the decrees of the diet; and in the imperial chamber and the aulic council, two judiciary tribunals having supreme jurisdiction in controversies which concern the empire, or which happen among its members.

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DeB 131 -1-The diet possesses the general power of legislating for the empire; of making war and peace; contracting alliances; assessing quotas of troops and money; constructing fortresses; regulating coin; admitting new members; and subjecting disobedient members to the ban of the empire, by which the party is degraded from his sovereign rights and his possessions forfeited. DeB 131 -2-The members of the confederacy are expressly restricted from entering into compacts prejudicial to the empire; from imposing tolls and duties on their mutual intercourse, without the consent of the emperor and diet; from altering the value of money; from doing injustice to one another; or from affording assistance or retreat to disturbers of the public peace. DeB 131 -3-And the ban is denounced against such as shall violate any of these restrictions. DeB 131 -4-The members of the diet, as such, are subject in all cases to be judged by the emperor and diet, and in their private capacities by the aulic council and imperial chamber.

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DeB 131 -1-The prerogatives of the emperor are numerous. DeB 131 -2-The most important of them are: his exclusive right to make propositions to the diet; to negative its resolutions; to name ambassadors; to confer dignities and titles; to fill vacant electorates; to found universities; to grant privileges not injurious to the states of the empire; to receive and apply the public revenues; and generally to watch over the public safety. DeB 131 -3-In certain cases, the electors form a council to him. DeB 131 -4-In quality of emperor, he possesses no territory within the empire, nor receives any revenue for his support. DeB 131 -5-But his revenue and dominions, in other qualities, constitute him one of the most powerful princes in Europe.

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DeB 131 -1-From such a parade of constitutional powers, in the representatives and head of this confederacy, the natural supposition would be, that it must form an exception to the general character which belongs to its kindred systems. DeB 131 -2-Nothing would be further from the reality. DeB 131 -3-The fundamental principle on which it rests, that the empire is a community of sovereigns, that the diet is a representation of sovereigns and that the laws are addressed to sovereigns, renders the empire a nerveless body, incapable of regulating its own members, insecure against external dangers, and agitated with unceasing fermentations in its own bowels.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=19- ParaX=7- XthisXParaX=7-
DeB 131 -1-The history of Germany is a history of wars between the emperor and the princes and states; of wars among the princes and states themselves; of the licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression of the weak; of foreign intrusions, and foreign intrigues; of requisitions of men and money disregarded, or partially complied with; of attempts to enforce them, altogether abortive, or attended with slaughter and desolation, involving the innocent with the guilty; of general inbecility, confusion, and misery.

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DeB 131 -1-In the sixteenth century, the emperor, with one part of the empire on his side, was seen engaged against the other princes and states. DeB 131 -2-In one of the conflicts, the emperor himself was put to flight, and very near being made prisoner by the elector of Saxony. DeB 131 -3-The late king of Prussia was more than once pitted against his imperial sovereign; and commonly proved an overmatch for him. DeB 131 -4-Controversies and wars among the members themselves have been so common, that the German annals are crowded with the bloody pages which describe them. DeB 131 -5-Previous to the peace of Westphalia, Germany was desolated by a war of thirty years, in which the emperor, with one half of the empire, was on one side, and Sweden, with the other half, on the opposite side. DeB 131 -6-Peace was at length negotiated, and dictated by foreign powers; and the articles of it, to which foreign powers are parties, made a fundamental part of the Germanic constitution.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=19- ParaX=9- XthisXParaX=9-
DeB 131 -1-If the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more united by the necessity of self-defense, its situation is still deplorable. DeB 131 -2-Military preparations must be preceded by so many tedious discussions, arising from the jealousies, pride, separate views, and clashing pretensions of sovereign bodies, that before the diet can settle the arrangements, the enemy are in the field; and before the federal troops are ready to take it, are retiring into winter quarters.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=19- ParaX=10- XthisXParaX=10-
DeB 131 -1-The small body of national troops, which has been judged necessary in time of peace, is defectively kept up, badly paid, infected with local prejudices, and supported by irregular and disproportionate contributions to the treasury.

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DeB 131 -1-The impossibility of maintaining order and dispensing justice among these sovereign subjects, produced the experiment of dividing the empire into nine or ten circles or districts; of giving them an interior organization, and of charging them with the military execution of the laws against delinquent and contumacious members. DeB 131 -2-This experiment has only served to demonstrate more fully the radical vice of the constitution. DeB 131 -3-Each circle is the miniature picture of the deformities of this political monster. DeB 131 -4-They either fail to execute their commissions, or they do it with all the devastation and carnage of civil war. DeB 131 -5-Sometimes whole circles are defaulters; and then they increase the mischief which they were instituted to remedy.

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DeB 131 -1-We may form some judgment of this scheme of military coercion from a sample given by Thuanus. DeB 131 -2-In Donawerth, a free and imperial city of the circle of Suabia, the Abb 300 de St. DeB 131 -3-Croix enjoyed certain immunities which had been reserved to him. DeB 131 -4-In the exercise of these, on some public occasions, outrages were committed on him by the people of the city. DeB 131 -5-The consequence was that the city was put under the ban of the empire, and the Duke of Bavaria, though director of another circle, obtained an appointment to enforce it. DeB 131 -6-He soon appeared before the city with a corps of ten thousand troops, and finding it a fit occasion, as he had secretly intended from the beginning, to revive an antiquated claim, on the pretext that his ancestors had suffered the place to be dismembered from his territory, [1] he took possession of it in his own name, disarmed, and punished the inhabitants, and reannexed the city to his domains.

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DeB 131 -1-It may be asked, perhaps, what has so long kept this disjointed machine from falling entirely to pieces? DeB 131 -2-The answer is obvious: The weakness of most of the members, who are unwilling to expose themselves to the mercy of foreign powers; the weakness of most of the principal members, compared with the formidable powers all around them; the vast weight and influence which the emperor derives from his separate and heriditary dominions; and the interest he feels in preserving a system with which his family pride is connected, and which constitutes him the first prince in Europe; --these causes support a feeble and precarious Union; whilst the repellant quality, incident to the nature of sovereignty, and which time continually strengthens, prevents any reform whatever, founded on a proper consolidation. DeB 131 -3-Nor is it to be imagined, if this obstacle could be surmounted, that the neighboring powers would suffer a revolution to take place which would give to the empire the force and preeminence to which it is entitled. DeB 131 -4-Foreign nations have long considered themselves as interested in the changes made by events in this constitution; and have, on various occasions, betrayed their policy of perpetuating its anarchy and weakness.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=19- ParaX=14- XthisXParaX=14-
DeB 131 -1-If more direct examples were wanting, Poland, as a government over local sovereigns, might not improperly be taken notice of. DeB 131 -2-Nor could any proof more striking be given of the calamities flowing from such institutions. DeB 131 -3-Equally unfit for self-government and self-defense, it has long been at the mercy of its powerful neighbors; who have lately had the mercy to disburden it of one third of its people and territories.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=19- ParaX=15- XthisXParaX=15-
DeB 131 -1-The connection among the Swiss cantons scarcely amounts to a confederacy; though it is sometimes cited as an instance of the stability of such institutions.

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DeB 131 -1-They have no common treasury; no common troops even in war; no common coin; no common judicatory; nor any other common mark of sovereignty.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=19- ParaX=17- XthisXParaX=17-
DeB 131 -1-They are kept together by the peculiarity of their topographical position; by their individual weakness and insignificancy; by the fear of powerful neighbors, to one of which they were formerly subject; by the few sources of contention among a people of such simple and homogeneous manners; by their joint interest in their dependent possessions; by the mutual aid they stand in need of, for suppressing insurrections and rebellions, an aid expressly stipulated and often required and afforded; and by the necessity of some regular and permanent provision for accomodating disputes among the cantons. DeB 131 -2-The provision is, that the parties at variance shall each choose four judges out of the neutral cantons, who, in case of disagreement, choose an umpire. DeB 131 -3-This tribunal, under an oath of impartiality, pronounces definitive sentence, which all the cantons are bound to enforce. DeB 131 -4-The competency of this regulation may be estimated by a clause in their treaty of 1683, with Victor Amadeus of Savoy; in which he obliges himself to interpose as mediator in disputes between the cantons, and to employ force, if necessary, against the contumacious party.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=19- ParaX=18- XthisXParaX=18-
DeB 131 -1-So far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of comparison with that of the United States, it serves to confirm the principle intended to be established. DeB 131 -2-Whatever efficacy the union may have had in ordinary cases, it appears that the moment a cause of difference sprang up, capable of trying its strength, it failed. DeB 131 -3-The controversies on the subject of religion, which in three instances have kindled violent and bloody contests, may be said, in fact, to have severed the league. DeB 131 -4-The Protestant and Catholic cantons have since had their separate diets, where all the most important concerns are adjusted, and which have left the general diet little other business than to take care of the common bailages.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=19- ParaX=19- XthisXParaX=19-
DeB 131 -1-That separation had another consequence, which merits attention.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=19- ParaX=901- XthisXParaX=901-
DeB 131 -1-1. Pfeffel, "Nouvel Abreg. Chronol. de l'Hist., etc., d'Allemagne," says the pretext was to indemnify himself for the expense of the expedition.

Beginning of Federalist Paper No. 19

Close

NO. 20    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 21    Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 22    The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 23    The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
NO. 24    The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 25    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 26    The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 27    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 28    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 29    THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy
NO. 30    Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 31    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 32    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 33    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 34    The Same Subject Continued Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 35    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 36    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 37    Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
NO. 38    The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
NO. 39    The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
NO. 40    The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
NO. 41    General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution
NO. 42    The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 43    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 44    Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
NO. 45    The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
NO. 46    The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
NO. 47    The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
NO. 48    These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
NO. 49    Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
NO. 50    Periodic Appeals to the People Considered
NO. 51    The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
NO. 52    The House of Representatives
NO. 53    The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives
NO. 54    The Apportionment of Members Among the States
NO. 55    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 56    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 57    The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
NO. 58    Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
NO. 59    Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 60    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 61    The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
NO. 62    The Senate
NO. 63    The Senate Continued
NO. 64    The Powers of the Senate
NO. 65    The Powers of the Senate Continued
NO. 66    Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
NO. 67    The Executive Department
NO. 68    The Mode of Electing the President
NO. 69    The Real Character of the Executive
NO. 70    The Executive Department Further Considered
NO. 71    The Duration in Office of the Executive.
NO. 72    The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
NO. 73    The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
NO. 74    The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
NO. 75    The Treaty Making Power of the Executive
NO. 76    The Appointing Power of the Executive
NO. 77    The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
NO. 78    The Judiciary Department
NO. 79    The Judiciary Department Continued
NO. 80    The Powers of the Judiciary
NO. 81    The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
NO. 82    The Judiciary Continued
NO. 83    The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
NO. 84    Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
NO. 85    Concluding Remarks
NO. 449   
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