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NO. 1    General Inroduction
NO. 2    Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 3    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 4    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
NO. 5    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence.
NO. 6    Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
NO. 7    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States.
NO. 8    The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
NO. 9    The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 10    The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
NO. 11    The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
Close
End of Federalist Paper No. 11
FEDERALIST NO. 11
The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
For the Independent Journal     Saturday November 24, 1787
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of New York


DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=11- ParaX=1- XthisXParaX=1-
DeB 131 -1-THE importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those points about which there is least room to entertain a difference of opinion, and which has, in fact, commanded the most general assent of men who have any acquaintance with the subject. DeB 131 -2-This applies as well to our intercourse with foreign countries as with each other.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=11- ParaX=2- XthisXParaX=2-
DeB 131 -1-There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of America, has already excited uneasy sensations in several of the maritime powers of Europe. DeB 131 -2-They seem to be apprehensive of our too great interference in that carrying trade, which is the support of their navigation and the foundation of their naval strength. DeB 131 -3-Those of them which have colonies in America look forward to what this country is capable of becoming, with painful solicitude. DeB 131 -4-They foresee the dangers that may threaten their American dominions from the neighborhood of States, which have all the dispositions, and would possess all the means, requisite to the creation of a powerful marine. DeB 131 -5-Impressions of this kind will naturally indicate the policy of fostering divisions among us, and of depriving us, as far as possible, of an ACTIVE COMMERCE in our own bottoms. DeB 131 -6-This would answer the threefold purpose of preventing our interference in their navigation, of monopolizing the profits of our trade, and of clipping the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness. DeB 131 -7-Did not prudence forbid the detail, it would not be difficult to trace, by facts, the workings of this policy to the cabinets of ministers.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=11- ParaX=3- XthisXParaX=3-
DeB 131 -1-If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly to our prosperity in a variety of ways. DeB 131 -2-By prohibitory regulations, extending, at the same time, throughout the States, we may oblige foreign countries to bid against each other, for the privileges of our markets. DeB 131 -3-This assertion will not appear chimerical to those who are able to appreciate the importance of the markets of three millions of people--increasing in rapid progression, for the most part exclusively addicted to agriculture, and likely from local circumstances to remain so--to any manufacturing nation; and the immense difference there would be to the trade and navigation of such a nation, between a direct communication in its own ships, and an indirect conveyance of its products and returns, to and from America, in the ships of another country. DeB 131 -4-Suppose, for instance, we had a government in America, capable of excluding Great Britain (with whom we have at present no treaty of commerce) from all our ports; what would be the probable operation of this step upon her politics? DeB 131 -5-Would it not enable us to negotiate, with the fairest prospect of success, for commercial privileges of the most valuable and extensive kind, in the dominions of that kingdom? DeB 131 -6-When these questions have been asked, upon other occasions, they have received a plausible, but not a solid or satisfactory answer. DeB 131 -7-It has been said that prohibitions on our part would produce no change in the system of Britain, because she could prosecute her trade with us through the medium of the Dutch, who would be her immediate customers and paymasters for those articles which were wanted for the supply of our markets. DeB 131 -8-But would not her navigation be materially injured by the loss of the important advantage of being her own carrier in that trade? DeB 131 -9-Would not the principal part of its profits be intercepted by the Dutch, as a compensation for their agency and risk? DeB 131 -10-Would not the mere circumstance of freight occasion a considerable deduction? DeB 131 -11-Would not so circuitous an intercourse facilitate the competitions of other nations, by enhancing the price of British commodities in our markets, and by transferring to other hands the management of this interesting branch of the British commerce?

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=11- ParaX=4- XthisXParaX=4-
DeB 131 -1-A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these questions will justify a belief that the real disadvantages to Britain from such a state of things, conspiring with the pre-possessions of a great part of the nation in favor of the American trade, and with the importunities of the West India islands, would produce a relaxation in her present system, and would let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets of those islands elsewhere, from which our trade would derive the most substantial benefits. DeB 131 -2-Such a point gained from the British government, and which could not be expected without an equivalent in exemptions and immunities in our markets, would be likely to have a correspondent effect on the conduct of other nations, who would not be inclined to see themselves altogether supplanted in our trade.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=11- ParaX=5- XthisXParaX=5-
DeB 131 -1-A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations toward us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a federal navy. DeB 131 -2-There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union under an efficient government would put it in our power, at a period not very distant, to create a navy which, if it could not vie with those of the great maritime powers, would at least be of respectable weight if thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties. DeB 131 -3-This would be more peculiarly the case in relation to operations in the West Indies. DeB 131 -4-A few ships of the line, sent opportunely to the reinforcement of either side, would often be sufficient to decide the fate of a campaign, on the event of which interests of the greatest magnitude were suspended. DeB 131 -5-Our position is, in this respect, a most commanding one. DeB 131 -6-And if to this consideration we add that of the usefulness of supplies from this country, in the prosecution of military operations in the West Indies, it will readily be perceived that a situation so favorable would enable us to bargain with great advantage for commercial privileges. DeB 131 -7-A price would be set not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality. DeB 131 -8-By a steady adherence to the Union we may hope, erelong, to become the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may dictate.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=11- ParaX=6- XthisXParaX=6-
DeB 131 -1-But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover that the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each other, and would frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature has kindly placed within our reach. DeB 131 -2-In a state so insignificant our commerce would be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of all nations at war with each other; who, having nothing to fear from us, would with little scruple or remorse, supply their wants by depredations on our property as often as it fell in their way. DeB 131 -3-The rights of neutrality will only be respected when they are defended by an adequate power. DeB 131 -4-A nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being neutral.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=11- ParaX=7- XthisXParaX=7-
DeB 131 -1-Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth. DeB 131 -2-This situation would even take away the motive to such combinations, by inducing an impracticability of success. DeB 131 -3-An active commerce, an extensive navigation, and a flourishing marine would then be the offspring of moral and physical necessity. DeB 131 -4-We might defy the little arts of the little politicians to control or vary the irresistible and unchangeable course of nature.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=11- ParaX=8- XthisXParaX=8-
DeB 131 -1-But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist and might operate with success. DeB 131 -2-It would be in the power of the maritime nations, availing themselves of our universal impotence, to prescribe the conditions of our political existence; and as they have a common interest in being our carriers, and still more in preventing our becoming theirs, they would in all probability combine to embarrass our navigation in such a manner as would in effect destroy it, and confine us to a PASSIVE COMMERCE. DeB 131 -3-We should then be compelled to content ourselves with the first price of our commodities, and to see the profits of our trade snatched from us to enrich our enemies and persecutors. DeB 131 -4-That unequaled spirit of enterprise, which signalizes the genius of the American merchants and navigators, and which is in itself an inexhaustible mine of national wealth, would be stifled and lost, and poverty and disgrace would overspread a country which, with wisdom, might make herself the admiration and envy of the world.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=11- ParaX=9- XthisXParaX=9-
DeB 131 -1-There are rights of great moment to the trade of America which are rights of the Union--I allude to the fisheries, to the navigation of the Western lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. DeB 131 -2-The dissolution of the Confederacy would give room for delicate questions concerning the future existence of these rights; which the interest of more powerful partners would hardly fail to solve to our disadvantage. DeB 131 -3-The disposition of Spain with regard to the Mississippi needs no comment. DeB 131 -4-France and Britain are concerned with us in the fisheries, and view them as of the utmost moment to their navigation. DeB 131 -5-They, of course, would hardly remain long indifferent to that decided mastery, of which experience has shown us to be possessed in this valuable branch of traffic, and by which we are able to undersell those nations in their own markets. DeB 131 -6-What more natural than that they should be disposed to exclude from the lists such dangerous competitors?

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=11- ParaX=10- XthisXParaX=10-
DeB 131 -1-This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial benefit. DeB 131 -2-All the navigating States may, in different degrees, advantageously participate in it, and under circumstances of a greater extension of mercantile capital, would not be unlikely to do it. DeB 131 -3-As a nursery of seamen, it now is, or when time shall have more nearly assimilated the principles of navigation in the several States, will become, a universal resource. DeB 131 -4-To the establishment of a navy, it must be indispensable.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=11- ParaX=11- XthisXParaX=11-
DeB 131 -1-To this great national object, a NAVY, union will contribute in various ways. DeB 131 -2-Every institution will grow and flourish in proportion to the quantity and extent of the means concentred towards its formation and support. DeB 131 -2-A unity of commercial, as well as political, interests, can only result from a unity of government. DeB 131 -3-A navy of the United States, as it would embrace the resources of all, is an object far less remote than a navy of any single State or partial confederacy, which would only embrace the resources of a single part. DeB 131 -4-It happens, indeed, that different portions of confederated America possess each some peculiar advantage for this essential establishment. DeB 131 -5-The more southern States furnish in greater abundance certain kinds of naval stores--tar, pitch, and turpentine. DeB 131 -6-Their wood for the construction of ships is also of a more solid and lasting texture. DeB 131 -7-The difference in the duration of the ships of which the navy might be composed, if chiefly constructed of Southern wood, would be of signal importance, either in the view of naval strength or of national economy. DeB 131 -8-Some of the Southern and of the Middle States yield a greater plenty of iron, and of better quality. DeB 131 -9-Seamen must chiefly be drawn from the Northern hive. DeB 131 -10-The necessity of naval protection to external or maritime commerce does not require a particular elucidation, no more than the conduciveness of that species of commerce to the prosperity of a navy.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=11- ParaX=12- XthisXParaX=12-
DeB 131 -1-An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to foreign markets. DeB 131 -2-The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished, and will acquire additional motion and vigor from a free circulation of the commodities of every part. DeB 131 -3-Commercial enterprise will have much greater scope, from the diversity in the productions of different States. DeB 131 -4-When the staple of one fails from a bad harvest or unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the staple of another. DeB 131 -5-The variety, not less than the value, of products for exportation contributes to the activity of foreign commerce. DeB 131 -6-It can be conducted upon much better terms with a large number of materials of a given value than with a small number of materials of the same value; arising from the competitions of trade and from the fluctations of markets. DeB 131 -7-Particular articles may be in great demand at certain periods, and unsalable at others; but if there be a variety of articles, it can scarcely happen that they should all be at one time in the latter predicament, and on this account the operations of the merchant would be less liable to any considerable obstruction or stagnation. DeB 131 -8-The speculative trader will at once perceive the force of these observations, and will acknowledge that the aggregate balance of the commerce of the United States would bid fair to be much more favorable than that of the thirteen States without union or with partial unions.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=11- ParaX=13- XthisXParaX=13-
DeB 131 -1-It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the States are united or disunited, there would still be an intimate intercourse between them which would answer the same ends; this intercourse would be fettered, interrupted, and narrowed by a multiplicity of causes, which in the course of these papers have been amply detailed.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=11- ParaX=14- XthisXParaX=14-
DeB 131 -1-There are other points of view in which this subject might be placed, of a striking and animating kind. DeB 131 -2-But they would lead us too far into the regions of futurity, and would involve topics not proper for a newspaper discussion. DeB 131 -3-I shall briefly observe, that our situation invites and our interests prompt us to aim at an ascendant in the system of American affairs. DeB 131 -4-The world may politically, as well as geographically, be divided into four parts, each having a distinct set of interests. DeB 131 -5-Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms and by her negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees, extended her dominion over them all. DeB 131 -6-Africa, Asia, and America, have successively felt her domination. DeB 131 -7-The superiority she has long maintained has tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of the World, and to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit. DeB 131 -8-Men admired as profound philosophers have, in direct terms, attributed to her inhabitants a physical superiority, and have gravely asserted that all animals, and with them the human species, degenerate in America--that even dogs cease to bark after having breathed awhile in our atmosphere.[1] DeB 131 -9-Facts have too long supported these arrogant pretensions of the Europeans. DeB 131 -10-It belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation. DeB 131 -11-Union will enable us to do it. DeB 131 -12-Disunion will will add another victim to his triumphs. DeB 131 -13-Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world!.

DeB 128 C 18Mod=18- FP2View=11- ParaX=901- XthisXParaX=901-
DeB 131 -1-1. "Recherches philosophiques sur les Americains."

Beginning of Federalist Paper No. 11

Close

NO. 12    The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue.
NO. 13    Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government.
NO. 14    Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered.
NO. 15    The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 16    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 17    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 18    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 19    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
NO. 20    The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union.
NO. 21    Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 22    The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation
NO. 23    The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
NO. 24    The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 25    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
NO. 26    The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 27    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 28    The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
NO. 29    THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy
NO. 30    Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 31    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 32    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 33    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 34    The Same Subject Continued Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 35    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 36    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
NO. 37    Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
NO. 38    The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
NO. 39    The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
NO. 40    The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
NO. 41    General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution
NO. 42    The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 43    The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
NO. 44    Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
NO. 45    The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
NO. 46    The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
NO. 47    The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
NO. 48    These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
NO. 49    Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
NO. 50    Periodic Appeals to the People Considered
NO. 51    The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
NO. 52    The House of Representatives
NO. 53    The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives
NO. 54    The Apportionment of Members Among the States
NO. 55    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 56    The Total Number of the House of Representatives
NO. 57    The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
NO. 58    Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
NO. 59    Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 60    The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
NO. 61    The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
NO. 62    The Senate
NO. 63    The Senate Continued
NO. 64    The Powers of the Senate
NO. 65    The Powers of the Senate Continued
NO. 66    Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
NO. 67    The Executive Department
NO. 68    The Mode of Electing the President
NO. 69    The Real Character of the Executive
NO. 70    The Executive Department Further Considered
NO. 71    The Duration in Office of the Executive.
NO. 72    The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
NO. 73    The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
NO. 74    The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
NO. 75    The Treaty Making Power of the Executive
NO. 76    The Appointing Power of the Executive
NO. 77    The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
NO. 78    The Judiciary Department
NO. 79    The Judiciary Department Continued
NO. 80    The Powers of the Judiciary
NO. 81    The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
NO. 82    The Judiciary Continued
NO. 83    The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
NO. 84    Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
NO. 85    Concluding Remarks
NO. 449   
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